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ARTICLE
GETTING LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
WHERE THEY NEED TO GO WITHOUT
TAKING TAXPAYERS FOR A RIDE:
“CABS,” WHY THEY ARE USED, AND WHAT
CAN BE DONE TO PREVENT THEIR MISUSE
HEATHER G. WHITE*
The United States has tremendous infrastructure needs, and if those needs are to be
met, local governments are likely to play a significant role in fulfilling them. Local
governments spend hundreds of billions of dollars annually building infrastructure, and
much of this is financed with debt in the form of bonds payable from real property taxes.
Ideally, the cost of a capital project would be spread evenly over its life so all taxpayers
who benefit from the project contribute to its cost. However, local political leaders have
incentives to defer payment, requiring future taxpayers to pay more than their fair share.
This article discusses an extreme example of this—the use of long-term compound
interest bonds, on which neither principal nor interest is paid until at or near maturity.
The article describes the problems with the extensive use of this form of financing and
explores the reasons California and Texas school districts issue hundreds of millions of
dollars of these bonds annually, then considers alternative means of addressing those
problems, including recent California and Texas legislation. It is critical that problems
with the framework within which local governments issue debt, such as those that lead to
the misuse of long-term compound interest bonds, be addressed.
* Ms. White is a practicing public finance lawyer affiliated with Nixon Peabody LLP and is a
fellow in the Taxation Law and Policy Research Group at the University of Western Australia Law
School. Thanks to Rick Krever, to my professional colleagues, and to participants at the Australasian
Tax Teachers Association conference and the Monash University Taxation Law and Policy Research
Group symposium for helpful comments. All errors are my own.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Every four years, the American Society of Civil Engineers releases its
Infrastructure Report Card, which, like a school report card, assigns a
letter grade to the condition of American infrastructure.1 The 2017 grade
is a D+, and the Society indicates that nearly $4.6 trillion of infrastructure
investment is needed over the next ten years.2 If pressing infrastructure
needs are to be met, it is likely that local governments will play a major role
in fulfilling them. Local governments construct much of the public
infrastructure in the United States, and President Trump’s infrastructure
plan is expected to require substantial spending by local governments.3
Local governments frequently borrow to build facilities, many of which
are intended to last for decades.4 Ideally, the cost of this infrastructure—
and hence the payments on the debt issued to finance it—would be spread
evenly over its life so that neither today’s nor tomorrow’s taxpayers (or
users) pay more than their fair share. Yet, in recent years, in California,
Texas, and elsewhere, there has been considerable—perhaps even
excessive—reliance on long-term compound interest bonds (referred to as
“capital appreciation bonds” or “CABs”), on which neither principal nor
interest is paid until at or near maturity.5 This article explores this
phenomenon, considers some of the factors that may cause local
governments to resort to a financing structure that on its face seems
unfair, and presents alternative means of addressing misuse of this
financing tool, including recent California and Texas legislation.
This article focuses on the use, by California and Texas school districts,
of debt that is payable from property taxes (referred to as “general
obligation bonds”)6 and the reasons districts sometimes issue this debt in
1. AM. SOC’Y OF CIVIL ENG’RS, 2017 INFRASTRUCTURE REPORT CARD 1 (2017).
2. Id. at 5, 8.
3. See Jim Watts, Trump’s $1 Trillion Infrastructure Plan Requires State, Local Funding Match, The
BOND BUYER (June 7, 2017), https://www.bondbuyer.com/news/trumps-1-trillion-infrastructureplan-requires-state-local-funding-match [https://perma.cc/KN2N-AND9] (noting the plan would
require states and localities to provide matching funds to obtain federal funding for infrastructure).
4. See GRANT A. DRIESSEN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30638, TAX-EXEMPT BONDS: A
DESCRIPTION OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT DEBT 1 (2016) (“[W]hen a municipal
government issues bonds, the principal (or proceeds) is typically used to finance the construction of
capital facilities”).
5. See infra note 9 and Part III for a discussion of the problems associated with CABs.
6. The term “general obligation bonds” refers to bonds supported by the issuer’s full faith and
credit, power to levy ad valorem property taxes, or both. NAT’L ASS’N OF BOND LAWYERS, GENERAL
OBLIGATION BONDS: STATE LAW, BANKRUPTCY AND DISCLOSURE CONSIDERATIONS i–ii, 1–4
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the form of CABs. California and Texas school districts administer public
schools within their geographic areas and are controlled by locally elected
governing boards.7 There are approximately 1,000 school districts in each
of these states, each serving anywhere from a few students to hundreds of
thousands of students.8
In recent years, California and Texas have been among the states where
CABs are used most, and in both states, school districts are the most
frequent issuers of this type of debt, issuing hundreds of millions of dollars
of these bonds.9 California legislation limiting the use of CABs (AB 182)
took effect in January 2014.10 Texas legislation with the same purpose
(HB 114) took effect in September 2015.11 The controversy surrounding
(2014). This article uses the term to refer to bonds that are supported by an unlimited pledge of ad
valorem property taxes, but not by other revenues or assets. Sometimes general obligation bonds are
referred to as “unlimited tax bonds.” See Glossary of Municipal Securities Terms: Unlimited Tax Bond,
MUN. SEC. RULEMAKING BD., http://www.msrb.org/glossary/definition/unlimited-tax-bond.aspx
[https://perma.cc/73LJ-DDV4] (defining unlimited tax bonds as “bond[s] payable from ad valorem
taxes that are not limited by law in rate or amount”). The analysis in this article draws on technical
issues discussed in The Bond Lawyer, a publication of the National Association of Bond Lawyers.
Heather G. White, Catching Too Many “CABs”?, BOND LAW., Winter 2017, at 4.
7. CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 35100–35125 (Deering 2013); TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. §§ 11.002–
11.0511 (West 2012).
8. Fingertip Facts on Education in California – CalEdFacts, CAL. DEP’T OF EDUC.,
https://www.cde.ca.gov/ds/sd/cb/ceffingertipfacts.asp [https://perma.cc/8V6V-HWNT]; Largest
&
Smallest
Public
School
Districts
–
CalEdFacts,
CAL. DEP’T OF EDUC.,
http://www.cde.ca.gov/ds/sd/cb/ceflargesmalldist.asp [http://perma.cc/HN6C-UW2D]; Snapshot
2016: District Size, TEX. EDUC. AGENCY, https://rptsvr1.tea.texas.gov/perfreport/snapshot/
2016/distsize.html [https://perma.cc/AAC2-WAL3] (click each column heading to view school
districts that fall within the size indicated at the top of each column).
9. See Press Release, Fitch Ratings, Fitch: Capital Appreciation Bonds May Pressure School
Districts, (Aug. 29, 2012) [hereinafter Fitch Ratings Press Release], available at
https://www.fitchratings.com/site/fitch-home/pressrelease?id=759075 [https://perma.cc/7GJGCAAY] (noting school districts in rapidly growing states including California and Texas use CABs
often). School districts were responsible for 83.6% of the CABs issuances and 64.1% of the principal
amount issued in California in 2015, and for 87.8% of the issuances and 99.2% of the principal
amount issued in Texas in the fiscal year that ended on August 31, 2015 (Texas fiscal year 2015),
based on data from the California Debt and Investment Advisory Commission (CDIAC) and the
Texas Bond Review Board (TBRB), respectively. California Issuances 2015 (2016) (unpublished
data) (on file with author) [hereinafter California Issuances 2015]; Texas Bond Review Board
Issuances Texas Fiscal Years 2007–2015 (2015) (unpublished data) (on file with author) [hereinafter
TBRB Issuances FY 2007–2015]. California school districts issued over $700 million original
principal amount of CABs in 2015, and Texas school districts issued over $200 million in Texas fiscal
year 2015, based on data from CDIAC and the TBRB. Id.
10. Assemb. B. 182, 2013–2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013).
11. Act of May 26, 2015, 84th Leg., R.S., ch. 991, §§ 1–3, sec. 1201.0245, 2015 Tex. Gen.
Laws 3517–3519 (codified at TEX. GOV’T CODE § 1201.0245).
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CABs that led to AB 182 and HB 114 focused on school districts.12 One
of the transactions that received considerable attention was the 2011
issuance of $105 million CABs by the Poway Unified School District in
California (Poway Transaction).13 No payments are required on these
bonds until 2033, but nearly $1 billion will be due between 2033 and
2051.14 While this is an extreme example, it demonstrates the issue that
exists to varying degrees with all CABs.
Problems with the framework within which local government debt is
issued, including those that lead to the misuse of capital appreciation
bonds, must be addressed because of the important role that local
government debt plays in public construction in the United States and the
nation’s looming infrastructure needs. Adding to the significance of these
problems is the fact the United States federal government and state
governments subsidize most local government borrowing.15 The federal
12. See Ian Lovett, California Schools Finance Upgrades by Making the Next Generation
Pay, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 9, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/10/us/10schools.html?_r=0
[https://perma.cc/ENS6-9DEC] (quoting California Treasurer Bill Lockyer as analogizing the use of
CABs as “the school district’s version of printing money”); Mark Lisheron, Texas Schools Pass Debt on
to the Next Generation, WATCHDOG.ORG (Nov. 6, 2013), http://watchdog.org/114596/texas-schoolspass-debt-next-generation/ [https://perma.cc/5CPP-SAHL] (reporting the filing of bills by Texas
representatives to modify the use of CABs due to their propensity to be abused); Dan Weikel,
Risky Bonds Tie Schools to Huge Debt, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 29, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/
2012/nov/29/local/la-me-school-bond-20121129 [https://perma.cc/7HU5-3MJQ] (describing the
dangers and concerns surrounding CABs).
13. Will Carless, Where Borrowing $105 Million Will Cost $1 Billion: Poway Schools, VOICE OF SAN
DIEGO (Aug. 6, 2012), http://www.voiceofsandiego.org/topics/education/where-borrowing-105million-will-cost-1-billion-poway-schools/ [https://perma.cc/3DAX-MU7J]; see also Randall Jensen,
Calif. Capital Appreciation Bonds Have Unintended Consequences, THE BOND BUYER
(Sept. 20. 2012) [hereinafter Jensen, Calif. Capital Appreciation Bonds Have Unintended Consequences],
http://www.bondbuyer.com/issues/121_183/california-school-districts-capital-appreciation-bondsconsequences-1044196-1.html [https://perma.cc/QSE8-C4KD] (stating the Poway Schools’
$105 million bond will “require nearly $1 billion in debt service at their 40-year maturity”); Lovett,
supra note 12 (“And in the most expensive case yet, the Poway Unified School District borrowed
$105 million to finish modernizing older school buildings, which local property owners will be paying
off until four decades from now at an eventual cost of nearly $1 billion.”); Weikel, supra note 12 (“By
the maturity date of 2051, however, the $105 million in Poway notes will cost district taxpayers
almost $1 billion in principal and interest[—]more than $9 for every $1 borrowed.”).
14. POWAY UNIFIED SCH. DIST., $105,000,149.70 GENERAL OBLIGATION BONDS OF
SCHOOL FACILITIES IMPROVEMENT DISTRICT NO. 2007-1 OF THE POWAY UNIFIED SCHOOL
DISTRICT, 2008 ELECTION, SERIES B (SAN DIEGO COUNTY, CALIFORNIA) 13 (2011) [hereinafter
POWAY UNIFIED SCH. DIST., 2011 OFFICIAL STATEMENT], http://64.79.135.236/docs/SFID%
20No.%202007-1,%20GOB%202008%20Series%20B.pdf [https://perma.cc/U98Y-GTFE].
15. GRANT A. DRIESSEN, Summary to CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30638, TAX-EXEMPT
BONDS: A DESCRIPTION OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT DEBT (2016) (“The federal
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government reduces the cost to state and local governments of issuing
debt by making interest earnings on most of such debt exempt from
federal income tax.16 Tax-exempt debt typically bears interest at a lower
rate than taxable debt of identical credit quality because lenders receive the
benefit of tax exemption.17 Interest on most state and local government
debt is also exempt from home state taxation.18
Part II of this article provides general background information,
including a brief introduction to local government bonds (also referred to
as “municipal bonds”), the key legal limits that apply to these bonds
(particularly to California and Texas school district general obligation
bonds), and the differences between capital appreciation bonds and other
local government bonds. Part III discusses the most significant problems
associated with the use of long-term CABs, including concerns about
interperiod equity, costs, and transparency. Some of the factors that
appear to contribute to the use of CABs despite these problems are
canvassed in Part IV. Part V outlines recent legislation adopted in
California and Texas to limit the use of CABs and highlights similarities
and differences in the approaches taken in these two states. Finally,
Part VI sets out the potential means to prevent misuse of CABs. The
lessons this article draws from the California and Texas school district
experience with CABs can be applied to local governments generally.

government subsidizes the cost of most state and local debt by excluding the interest income from
federal income taxation.”).
16. Traditionally, the vast majority of state and local government securities are issued on a taxexempt basis. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT ON THE MUNICIPAL SECURITIES MARKET 11
(2012). In 2015, the loss of federal tax revenue (also referred to as a “tax expenditure”)—resulting
from the exemption from income of interest on public purpose tax-exempt bonds—was
$29.4 billion. GRANT A. DRIESSEN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30638, TAX-EXEMPT BONDS: A
DESCRIPTION OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT DEBT 3 (2016).
17. See GRANT A. DRIESSEN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30638, TAX-EXEMPT BONDS: A
DESCRIPTION OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT DEBT 1 (2016) (detailing the benefits of taxexempt bonds).
18. State Tax Treatment of Municipal Bonds: 2012, THE BOND BUYER (Aug. 5, 2013) (on file with
author).
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II. INTRODUCTION TO MUNICIPAL BONDS
A. Overview
There are more than 90,000 local governments in the United States,
including more than 12,500 school districts.19
State and local
governments (including school districts) put in place $258.5 billion of new
non-residential construction and improvements in 2016, including
$41.3 billion for primary and secondary school facilities.20 Much of this
construction is financed with state and local government debt.21 In 2015,
state and local governments issued $403.6 billion of debt with maturities of
at least thirteen months, and a total of approximately $3.7 trillion of state
and local government debt was outstanding (including debt issued in prior
years).22 Most of this is in the form of “bonds.”23 This term generally is
used to refer to local government debt securities with a maturity of more
than three years;24 most bonds have a significantly longer term, frequently
up to thirty years and, sometimes, even longer.25
Local governments, including California and Texas school districts,
issue bonds primarily to finance capital projects (“new money bonds”) and
19. CARMA HOGUE, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, NO. G12-CG-ORG, GOVERNMENT
ORGANIZATION SUMMARY REPORT: 2012, at 1 (2013), http://www2.census.gov/govs/cog/
g12_org.pdf [https://perma.cc/L3CH-LSSY].
20. Annual Value of State and Local Construction Put in Place 2008–2016, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
https://www.census.gov/construction/c30/historical_data.html [https://perma.cc/BN8W-LS7G].
The federal government only put in place $21.9 billion of similar projects in 2016. Id.
21. GRANT A. DRIESSEN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30638, TAX-EXEMPT BONDS: A
DESCRIPTION OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT DEBT 1 (2016).
22. SEC. INDUS. & FIN. MKTS. ASS’N, 2016 FACT BOOK 29, 33 (2016),
http://www2.sifma.org/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=8589963035 [https://perma.cc/5VPHR686]. Local government borrowing to finance capital improvements had become customary by the
early 1900s. A.M. HILLHOUSE, MUNICIPAL BONDS: A CENTURY OF EXPERIENCE 32 (photo
reprint 1975) (1936).
23. GRANT A. DRIESSEN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30638, TAX-EXEMPT BONDS: A
DESCRIPTION OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT DEBT 4 (2016).
24. Glossary of Municipal Securities Terms: Bond, MUN. SEC. RULEMAKING BD.,
http://www.msrb.org/glossary.aspx [https://perma.cc/Z887-56QB]. In some cases, “bonds” may
have a term shorter than three years. Glossary of Municipal Securities Terms: Short Term or Short Term
Range, MUN. SEC. RULEMAKING BD., http://www.msrb.org/Glossary/Definition/SHORT-TERMOR-SHORT-TERM-RANGE.aspx [https://perma.cc/7Z7R-WQUM]. Local governments also
issue “notes,” which generally have a shorter term. Glossary of Municipal Securities Terms:
Note, MUN. SEC. RULEMAKING BD., http://www.msrb.org/Glossary/Definition/NOTE.aspx
[https://perma.cc/J3A6-UWNH].
25. Bond, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/b/bond.asp [https://perma.
cc/L2H3-FHAT] (“Bond maturities can range from a day or less to more than 30 years.”).
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to refinance previously issued bonds (“refunding bonds”).26 Principal and
interest (“debt service”)27 on municipal bonds may be paid from a single
source or a combination of sources, including property taxes, sales taxes or
other taxes; the local government issuer’s general fund; or revenues from a
particular project.
Most debt issued by school districts in California and Texas is in the
form of general obligation bonds, several billion dollars of which are
issued annually in each state.28 These bonds are the focus of this article.
Principal and interest on California and Texas school district general
obligation bonds are payable from ad valorem real property tax assessments
that are levied solely for this purpose.29 Ad valorem property taxes are
calculated as a percentage of property value.30 These taxes generally are
collected shortly before debt service is due.31 Most, but not all, Texas
school district general obligation bonds are also guaranteed under the
Texas Permanent School Fund Bond Guarantee Program.32
26. STEVE MAGUIRE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41735, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
DEBT: AN ANALYSIS 2 (2011). Local governments also borrow to finance operating expenses. Id.
This is less common and is generally accomplished with shorter-term notes rather than with bonds.
Id; see Policy Basics: State and Local Borrowing, CENTER ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES (Jan. 15,
2015), https://www.cbpp.org/research/policy-basics-state-and-local-borrowing [https://perma.cc/
7KAC-5M7P] (“Almost all state and local bond debt is long-term debt incurred to pay for capital
expenditures . . . not to cover operating expenses.”). Proceeds of California and Texas school district
general obligation bonds cannot be used to pay operating expenses. See infra Section II. B.,
“Permitted Uses of Proceeds.”
27. Glossary of Municipal Securities Terms: Debt Service, MUN. SEC. RULEMAKING
BD., http://www.msrb.org/Glossary/Definition/DEBT-SERVICE.aspx [https://perma.cc/7PPDML6E].
28. In calendar year 2015, California school districts issued approximately $10.4 billion of
general obligation bonds (out of $11.6 billion of total school district debt). CAL. DEBT AND INV.
ADVISORY COMM’N, CDIAC No. 16.09, 2015 SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA PUBLIC DEBT ISSUANCE
1-3 (2015) [hereinafter CDIAC, 2015 SUMMARY], http://www.sto.ca.gov/cdiac/reports/annual/
2015/summary.pdf [https://perma.cc/H4GZ-856K]. Texas school districts issued approximately
$14.5 billion of general obligation bonds (out of $14.6 billion of total school district debt) in Texas
fiscal year 2016. TEX. BOND REVIEW BD., 2016 LOCAL GOVERNMENT ANNUAL REPORT 40 (2016)
[hereinafter TBRB, 2016 REPORT], www.brb.state.tx.us/pub/lgs/fy2016/2016LocalARFinal.pdf
[https://perma.cc/QZM3-XXTK].
29. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 15250 (Deering 2013); TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 45.003(b)(1)
(West 2012).
30. CAL. DEBT AND INV. ADVISORY COMM’N, CDIAC. NO. 06-04, CALIFORNIA DEBT
ISSUANCE PRIMER, at C-2 (2006) [hereinafter CDIAC PRIMER], http://www.treasurer.ca.gov/
cdiac/debtpubs/primer.pdf [https://perma.cc/RF46-N72N].
31. CAL. EDUC. § 15250; TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 26.04 (West Supp. 2017).
32. Of the $73.8 billion of outstanding general obligation bonds and limited tax bonds of
Texas school districts as of August 31, 2016, $68.3 billion was guaranteed by the program. TBRB,
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Bonds are usually issued in a group (referred to as a series) with
different maturities. Sometimes a single issuance consists of more than
one series, particularly when the bonds being issued have different
characteristics, such as having been approved by voters at different
elections, being issued for different purposes, or having different taxexempt status.33
B. Restrictions on Debt
Most states have constitutional restrictions, statutory restrictions, or
both on the amount and terms of debt that local governments within their
borders may issue.34 These restrictions are intended to serve a variety of
purposes, including promoting fiscally sound decision-making, reducing
the risk of default, preventing excessive burdens on taxpayers, and
promoting interperiod equity (the concept that the burden of paying for a
facility should be spread fairly over the period during which the facility is
used).35
2016 REPORT, supra note 28, at 37, 47. The Texas Permanent School Fund was established to benefit
Texas public schools. Bonds guaranteed by the fund receive the highest ratings from all three
agencies that rate municipal bonds. TEX. EDUC. AGENCY, TEXAS PERMANENT SCHOOL FUND
DISCLOSURE STATEMENT FOR BOND GUARANTEE PROGRAM 1, 17 (June 28, 2017) [hereinafter
TEXAS PERMANENT SCHOOL FUND DISCLOSURE STATEMENT], http://tea.texas.gov/WorkArea/
DownloadAsset.aspx?id=51539615528 [https://perma.cc/23BR-2G52] (click “I Agree”).
33. See, e.g., SAN DIEGO UNIFIED SCH. DIST., $65,434,441.70 SAN DIEGO UNIFIED SCHOOL
DISTRICT 2012 GENERAL OBLIGATION REFUNDING BONDS (DEDICATED UNLIMITED AD
VALOREM PROPERTY TAX BONDS) SERIES R-1, $56,869,830 SAN DIEGO UNIFIED SCHOOL
DISTRICT 2012 OBLIGATION REFUNDING BONDS (DEDICATED UNLIMITED AD VALOREM
PROPERTY TAX BONDS) SERIES R-2, http://emma.msrb.org/EP611468-EP478356-EP878739.pdf
[https://perma.cc/K99D-RQDN] (showing an example of two series of bonds as part of a single
issuance).
34. See U.S. ADVISORY COMM’N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, M-186, STATE
LAWS GOVERNING LOCAL GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE AND ADMINISTRATION 10 (1993)
(describing the prevalence of several types of restrictions); Paul G. Farnham, Re-examining Local Debt
Limits: A Disaggregated Analysis, 51 S. ECON. J. 1186, 1187 (1985) (noting all but five states have
restrictions on the use of debt by local governments); Clayton P. Gillette, Fiscal Home Rule, 86 DENV.
U. L. REV. 1241, 1255–56 (2009) (“Virtually every state constitution imposes limits on the amount of
debt that its political subdivisions can issue in order to fund capital projects . . . .”); James E. Spiotto,
The Role of the State in Supervising and Assisting Municipalities, Especially in Times of Financial Distress, MUN.
FIN. J., Spring 2013, at 1, 6–8 (discussing the limits states have placed on the debt municipalities may
issue).
35. See U.S. ADVISORY COMM’N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, STATE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY RESTRICTIONS ON LOCAL DEBT 37–39 (1961) (identifying
reasons for restrictions, including potential negative impacts of excessive debt on the borrowing
government, other local governments and the state); Gillette, supra note 34, at 255–56 (discussing the
reasons debt limitations were created, including protecting taxpayers and promoting interperiod
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Debt limits take different forms, such as requirements for voter
approval—often supermajority approval—limits on the amount of total
debt, and limits on the tax rate expected to be levied to service debt.36 In
addition, states typically impose constraints on the structure and terms of
debt and on the purposes for which bond proceeds—the amount received
by the issuer, consisting of the principal amount of the bonds plus original
issue premium or minus original issue discount37—can be used. The
restrictions that apply to California and Texas school district general
obligation bonds are described below.
Voter Approval Requirements. Both California and Texas require
voter approval of school district general obligation new money bonds.38
School districts in California may obtain voter approval under either of
two authorization regimes.39 The California Constitution generally
requires that general obligation bonds, issued by a local government, be
approved by two-thirds of the residents in the local government’s territory
voting on the matter (referred to in this article as the “California TwoThirds Regime”).40 A provision was added to the California Constitution
in late 2000 that allows school districts to issue general obligation bonds to
finance school facilities with the approval of 55% of the residents of the
district voting on the matter (referred to in this article as the “California
55% Regime”).41 Obtaining the approval of 55% of the voters is much
easier than obtaining approval of 2/3 of the voters.42 As a result, virtually
equity); Spiotto, supra, note 34 at 10 (identifying prevention of financial crises and defaults as a reason
for the imposition of debt limits).
36. See U.S. ADVISORY COMM’N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, supra note 35, at 27
(noting there are numerous types of restrictions on borrowing; and highlighting limits on the amount
of debt, tax rates, and voter approval requirements); Farnham, supra note 34, at 1187 (identifying
limits on the amount of debt and referendum requirements as the two major types of restrictions on
debt).
37. See infra section II.D. (discussing original issue premium and original issue discount).
38. CAL. CONST. art. XVI, § 18; TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 3(e); TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN.
§ 45.003(a) (West 2012).
39. CAL. CONST. art. XVI, § 18.
40. Id. art. XVI, § 18(a).
41. Id. art. XVI, § 18(b). Community college districts and county offices of education can also
obtain approval under the California 55% Regime, but other local governments cannot. Id.
42. While 79.4% of local educational bond measures presented to voters from 2001 through
2014 (including both California 55% Regime and California Two-Thirds Regime measures) passed;
the success rate would have been only 36.9% if the California 55% Regime had not been available.
KEVIN DAYTON, CAL. POLICY CTR., FOR THE KIDS: CALIFORNIA VOTERS MUST BECOME WARY
OF BORROWING BILLIONS MORE FROM WEALTHY INVESTORS FOR EDUCATIONAL
CONSTRUCTION 16 (2015).
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all voter authorizations for school district bonds since 2001 have been
obtained under the California 55% Regime.43 Districts occasionally still
use the California Two-Thirds Regime, however, because of the additional
requirements imposed under the California 55% Regime.44
To issue general obligation new money bonds, Texas school districts
must obtain the approval of a majority of the residents of the district
voting at an election held for that purpose.45 Once voter approval is
obtained, bonds often are issued in multiple issuances over a period of
several years.46
Expected Tax Rate Limits. In addition to voter authorization
requirements, both California and Texas restrict the issuance of school
district bonds by imposing limits on the tax rates for debt service that are
expected to result (referred to herein as “expected rate limits”); though the
California limits do not apply as broadly as the ones in Texas, as discussed
below.
California school districts may issue new money bonds approved under
the California 55% Regime, only if the tax rate expected to be needed—to
pay debt service on bonds approved at a single election—does not exceed
$30 per $100,000 of assessed valuation for elementary school districts and
high school districts, or $60 per $100,000 for unified school districts
(which include both elementary and high schools) in any year through the
maturity of the bonds.47 This restriction does not apply to bonds
approved under the California Two-Thirds Regime.48 Further, since the
expected rate limit applies to bonds approved at a single election only,
school districts can go back to voters at a subsequent election and ask
43. Only 110 of the 1,147 local educational bond measures presented to voters from 2001
through 2014 were under the California Two-Thirds Regime. Id.
44. These requirements include the expected rate limit described infra at notes 47–50 and
accompanying text, and the formation of a citizens’ oversight committee, among others. CAL. EDUC.
CODE §§ 15264–15288 (Deering 2013).
45. TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 3(e); TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 45.003(a) (West 2012).
46. See CAL. DEBT AND INV. ADVISORY COMM’N, CDIAC NO. 14-01, K-14 VOTER
APPROVED GENERAL OBLIGATION BONDS: AUTHORIZED, BUT UNISSUED 1–2 (2014)
[hereinafter CDIAC, VOTER APPROVED GENERAL OBLIGATION BONDS: AUTHORIZED BUT
UNISSUED] (indicating school districts issue their bonds for as many as 5-10 years after voter
approval is obtained); Bonds 101: Questions and Answers, MY TEXAS PUBLIC SCHOOL,
https://www.mytexaspublicschool.org/The-School-System/Funding/Bonds-101-Questions-andAnswers.aspx [https://perma.cc/B9XA-62FS] (noting bonds may be sold in multiple sales over a
period of time).
47. CAL. EDUC. §§ 15268, 15270(a).
48. Id.
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them to reauthorize the bonds, effectively doubling the limit. In fact, at
least eleven school districts obtained reauthorization from voters in 2012,
and at least another three did so in 2014.49 However, district officials may
be reluctant to seek additional voter approval for a variety of reasons,
including: because they do not believe they will obtain it; because they see
a significant political cost to requesting the approval; or because they need
to issue bonds quickly.50
The Texas limit, in contrast, applies to all general obligation bonds
issued by a school district and cannot be modified by the voters in the
district.51 Texas law requires that, before a school district issues general
obligation new money bonds, it must demonstrate that it has “a projected
ability to pay the principal of and interest on the proposed bonds and all
previously issued bonds . . . from a tax at a rate not to exceed $0.50 per
$100 of valuation” (adjusted to $0.45 per $100 for subsequent bond
issuances in some circumstances as described in the following
paragraph).52
Both California and Texas school districts must comply with expected
rate limits at the time bonds are issued.53 Should a higher tax rate
ultimately be necessary to pay debt service, the higher tax must be
levied.54 Texas law allows expected rate limits to be calculated based on
either historic assessed valuations or projections within specified
49. See INST. FOR SOC. RESEARCH, CTR. FOR CAL. STUDIES, CAL. STATE UNIV.,
SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA COUNTY, CITY AND SCHOOL DISTRICT ELECTION OUTCOMES, 2012
ELECTIONS, SCHOOL DISTRICT OFFICES AND BALLOT MEASURES 19–38 [hereinafter INST. FOR
SOC. RESEARCH, 2012 ELECTIONS], http://elections.cdn.sos.ca.gov/county-city-school-districtelection-results/2012/school-district-report-2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y2X3-JM6A] (providing the
data from which these figures were derived); INST. FOR SOC. RESEARCH, CTR. FOR CAL. STUDIES,
CAL. STATE UNIV., SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA COUNTY, CITY AND SCHOOL DISTRICT ELECTION
OUTCOMES, 2014 ELECTIONS, SCHOOL DISTRICT OFFICES AND BALLOT MEASURES 19–39
[hereinafter INST. FOR SOC. RESEARCH, 2014 ELECTIONS], http://elections.cdn.sos.ca.gov//countycity-school-district-election-results/2014/schooldistrict-report-2014.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2TR2FE5G] (providing additional data needed for these statistics); see, e.g., DALE SCOTT, WIN WIN: AN
INSIDER’S GUIDE TO SCHOOL BONDS 108–09 (2013) (describing an example of school bond
elections).
50. The election process takes time, and bonds may be approved under the California 55%
Regime only at statewide election or at a regularly scheduled local election (typically in June and
November). CAL. EDUC. § 15266(a) (Deering 2013).
51. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 45.0031(a) (West 2012).
52. Id. § 45.003. Districts may include state assistance that can legally be used for debt service.
Id.
53. CAL. EDUC. §§ 15268, 15270(a); TEX. EDUC. § 45.0031(a).
54. CAL. EDUC. § 15250 (Deering 2013); TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 26.04 (West Supp. 2017).
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parameters.55 If a district uses projections and the tax rate necessary to
pay debt service ultimately exceeds the expected rate limit, the limit is
adjusted to $0.45 for subsequent issuances.56 California law provides no
specific guidance on how to determine compliance and no penalty if actual
rates are higher than the limit.57
California Limit on Debt as a Percentage of Assessed Valuation.
California school districts may not issue general obligation new money
bonds if the total principal amount of general obligation bonds
outstanding after the issuance would exceed 1.25% of the assessed value of
taxable property of the district (2.50% for unified school districts).58
These caps can be—and in fact are—sometimes waived by the California
State Board of Education.59 While requests for waivers of this limit are
relatively infrequent, they are typically granted.60
Other Restrictions on Structure and Terms of Debt. California and
Texas also impose statutory restrictions on the structure and terms of
school district general obligation new money bonds. For example, these
bonds may be outstanding for no more than 40 years in either state, with
shorter maximum terms for CABs as a result of the passage of AB 182 and
HB 114.61 The maximum interest rate and maximum yield (taking into
account original issue discount) for general obligation bonds issued by
California school districts is 12% (8% for CABs as a result of AB 182).62
While in Texas, the maximum net effective interest rate (taking into
account original issue premium, discount and compounding of interest) is
15%.63 Different restrictions apply to refunding bonds.64
55. TEX. EDUC. §§ 45.0031(b)–(c) (West 2012). Most districts use historic assessed
valuations. See infra note 201.
56. TEX. EDUC. § 45.0031(e) (West 2012).
57. CAL. EDUC. §§ 15268, 15270(a).
58. Id. §§ 15102, 15106, 15268, 15270(a).
59. DAYTON, supra note 42, at 44.
60. Of fifty-one requests made between 2000 and 2014, forty-eight were approved and three
were withdrawn. Id. at 45. In contrast, the Board of Education has never granted a waiver of the
expected rate limit. July 2016 Agenda Item #W-10 3, CAL. STATE BD. OF EDUC. (2015),
http://www.cde.ca.gov/be/ag/ag/yr16/agenda201607.asp [https://perma.cc/78UT-SW3S].
61. CAL. EDUC. § 15144 (Deering 2013); CAL. GOV’T §§ 53508(f), 53508.5 (Deering 2011 &
Supp. 2017); TEX. EDUC. § 45.001(b) (West 2012); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 1201.0245(b)(1)
(West Supp. 2017). See infra Section V for discussion of AB 182 and HB 114.
62. CAL. EDUC. § 15143 (Deering 2013); CAL. GOV’T §§ 53508(d), 53508.5, 53531, 53532
(Deering 2011 & Supp. 2017).
63. TEX. GOV’T § 1204.006 (West 2013); see also id. §§ 1204.003, 1204.004, 1204.005 (setting
forth computations).
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Bonds that are issued on a tax-exempt basis (that is, bonds the interest
on which is excluded from income for federal income tax purposes) are
also subject to extensive requirements under the Internal Revenue Code of
1986 and related regulations.65 These requirements are intended to ensure
that proceeds of tax-exempt bonds are used for purposes and activities
deemed appropriate by the U.S. Congress and to prevent local
governments from issuing more tax-exempt bonds than they need, issuing
the bonds too far in advance of the time proceeds are used, or allowing the
bonds to remain unpaid for longer than is necessary.66
Permitted Uses of Proceeds. California and Texas school districts
may use general obligation bond proceeds only for certain purposes.
School districts generally may use proceeds of bonds approved under
the California Two-Thirds Regime to acquire, construct and improve
school lots and facilities.67 Bonds issued under the California 55%
Regime also may be used to finance furniture and equipment.68 California
districts are further limited to financing projects that are described in the
bond measure approved by the voters.69 In addition to paying direct
project costs, districts may use bond proceeds to pay the costs of the bond
issuance (including fees paid to financial advisors, underwriters, and
lawyers) and capitalized interest (interest on the bonds prior to expected
completion of the project or soon thereafter).70 California school districts
may not use general obligation bond proceeds for operating expenses.71
Texas school districts generally may use proceeds of general obligation
bonds to construct, acquire, improve and equip school sites and facilities,
and to acquire school buses.72 Districts may also use proceeds to pay
64. The most relevant of these restrictions in California and Texas are described in Sections
V.A., V.B., and V.C., infra.
65. 26 U.S.C. §§ 103, 141–150 (2012); see also INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., OFFICE OF TAX
EXEMPT BONDS, PUBLICATION 4079 TAX-EXEMPT GOVERNMENTAL BONDS (2016) (providing a
summary of some of the United States Treasury regulations that apply to tax-exempt bonds).
66. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX
REFORM ACT OF 1986, at 1151–56 (1987), http://www.jct.gov/jcs-10-87.pdf [https://perma.cc/
CB7U-YWP3] (discussing the reasons for the Tax Reform Act of 1986).
67. CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA, § 1(b)(2); CAL. EDUC. § 15100 (Deering 2013).
68. CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA, § 1(b)(3); id. art. XVI, § 18(b); CAL. EDUC. §§ 15100, 15266(b)
(Deering 2013).
69. CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA, § 1(b)(3); id. art. XVI, § 18(b); CAL. EDUC. § 15122 (Deering
2013); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 53410 (Deering 2011).
70. CAL. EDUC. §§ 15146(h), (j) (Deering 2016).
71. CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA, §§ 1(b)(2), 1(b)(3)(A); CAL. EDUC. §§ 15100, 15266(b).
72. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 45.001(a) (West 2012).
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costs of issuance and capitalized interest.73 Proceeds may not be used to
pay operating expenses.74 Texas districts, like those in California, are
limited to financing projects that are within the scope approved by the
voters.75
C. Repayment of Principal
Typically, principal of each bond is paid at maturity or over a period of
years leading up to maturity.76 However, because bonds are usually issued
in a series with multiple maturities, principal payments are typically made
over the life of a series of bonds, though the amount of such payments
may vary from year to year.77
D. Return on Investment
Municipal bonds provide return to investors in the form of interest,
original issue discount, or both.78 The interest rate on the bonds may be

73. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. §§ 1201.042(a), (d) (West Supp. 2017).
74. This prohibition has one limited exception that allows for the operation of the facility
itself during construction and for one year after. Id. § 1201.042(a).
75. CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA, § 1(b)(3); id. art. XVI, § 18(b); CAL. EDUC. § 15122 (Deering
2013); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 53410 (Deering 2011); TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 52.072(e)(1)(B)
(West Supp. 2016); TEX. GOV’T § 1201.042(e) (West Supp. 2017).
76. When principal is required to be paid over a period of years leading up to maturity, the
principal payments are referred to as “mandatory sinking fund payments” and the bonds are referred
to as being subject to “mandatory sinking fund redemption” in the amount of the payments. See
TBRB, 2016 REPORT, supra note 28, at 126 (defining a term bond and how payments are made).
Payments are allocated to investors by lot, meaning the bondholders do not know in advance which
holders will be repaid early. See, e.g., MOJAVE UNIFIED SCH. DIST. $8,040,000 GENERAL
OBLIGATION BONDS OF SCHOOL FACILITIES IMPROVEMENT DISTRICT NO. 1 OF THE MOJAVE
UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT (KERN COUNTY, CALIFORNIA) ELECTION OF 2014, SERIES 2015,
at F-2 (2015) [hereinafter MOJAVE ISD 2015 OFFICIAL STATEMENT], http://emma.msrb.org/
ER913004-ER713242-ER1114694.pdf [https://perma.cc/W6PY-TR86] (describing selection of
bonds for redemption as “randomly” and “by lot”); SCHERTZ-CIBOLO-UNIVERSAL CITY INDEP.
SCH. DIST., OFFICIAL STATEMENT DATED SEPTEMBER 18, 2014, at 4, 8 (2014),
https://emma.msrb.org/EP831962-EP644201-EP1045821.pdf
[https://perma.cc/AE26-L62A]
(describing the selection of bonds for redemption “by lot”).
77. See Andrew Ang & Richard C. Green, Discussion Paper, Lowering Borrowing Costs for States
and Municipalities Through CommonMuni, HAMILTON PROJECT, Feb. 2011, at 10 (“Since 1995, the
average municipal bond series has contained thirteen separate bonds . . . .”).
78. Investors may also earn capital gains if they trade municipal bonds in the secondary
market, but this does not directly affect local government issuers, and, therefore, is not a focus of this
article. See What to Expect When Selling Municipal Bonds Before Maturity, MSRB, http://www.msrb.org/
msrb1/EMMA/pdfs/Selling-Before-Maturity.pdf [https://perma.cc/WRG8-N3L2] (describing
factors that can affect the price of bonds in the secondary market).
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set at a fixed rate at the time they are issued: a rate that changes
periodically based on market conditions or a predetermined index.79
Virtually all California school district general obligation bonds bear interest
at a fixed rate, and only a very small percentage of Texas school district
general obligation bonds do not. Some local government bonds are sold
at a discount from their stated principal amount, meaning the investor
pays less than the face amount of the bond.80 This discount is referred to
as “original issue discount.”81 Original issue discount has the effect of
increasing the yield on the bond (the return to the investor) above the
nominal interest rate.82
Most of the time, local governments issue bonds on which they pay
interest periodically (usually semiannually) throughout the term of each
bond.83 Bonds on which interest is required to be paid in this manner are
referred to as “current interest bonds” or “CIBs.”84 Sometimes, local
governments, instead, issue bonds of the type that are the focus of this
paper—CABs—on which interest is added to principal (“compounded” or
“accreted”) periodically rather than being paid.85 The compounded
79. Glossary of Municipal Securities Terms: Fixed Rate, MUN. SEC. RULEMAKING
BD., http://msrb.org/Glossary/Definition/FIXED-RATE.aspx [https://perma.cc/4YXK-GTV2];
Glossary of Municipal Securities Terms: Variable Rate, MUN. SEC. RULEMAKING BD.,
http://msrb.org/glossary/definition/variable-rate.aspx [https://perma.cc/82ZN-Y63R].
80. CDIAC PRIMER, supra note 30, at C-18.
81. Id.; Glossary of Municipal Securities Terms: Original Issue Discount Bond or OID Bond, MUN.
SEC. RULEMAKING BD., http://msrb.org/Glossary/Definition/ORIGINAL-ISSUE-DISCOUNTBOND-OR-OID-BOND.aspx [https://perma.cc/JG97-GZFM].
82. The Underwriting Process, MSRB EDUCATION CENTER, http://www.msrb.org/
EducationCenter/Municipal-Market/Lifecycle/Primary/Underwriting-Process.aspx [https://perma.
cc/FG5D-2FJE].
83. See John E. Petersen, Innovations in Tax-Exempt Instruments and Transactions, NAT’L
TAX J., Dec. 1991, at 11, 15 (describing the traditional bond payment structure); ORANGE CTY.
GRAND JURY, SCHOOL BONDS—THE UNTOLD STORY OF ASSESSED VALUES 7 (2014)
[hereinafter ORANGE CTY. GRAND JURY, SCHOOL BONDS], http://www.ocgrandjury.org/pdfs/
2013_2014_GJreport/BondsReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/XUP9-84GV] (“A CIB typically pays the
interest due twice a year and the principal is repaid either at the end of the term of the bond or in a
series of annual principal payments toward the end of the term of the bond.”).
84. See ORANGE CTY. GRAND JURY, SCHOOL BONDS, supra note 83, at 7 (describing the
CIB).
85. Local governments also issue “convertible capital appreciation bonds,” which are a hybrid
of current interest bonds and capital appreciation bonds.
Bond sales: Questions and
Considerations for Districts, CAL. SCH. BDS. ASS’N, https://www.csba.org/GovernanceAndPolicy
Resources/~/media/CSBA/Files/GovernanceResources/GovernanceBriefs/201212GBBondSales.a
shx [https://perma.cc/KE6P-8GEP]. Interest on these bonds compounds until a specified
conversion date, then is paid periodically on the sum of the original principal amount plus the
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interest itself then bears interest until it is paid, together with principal, at
maturity.86 The sum of the principal plus the compounded interest to be
paid at maturity is referred to as the “maturity amount” or “maturity
value” of the CAB.87
It is common for local governments to issue bonds with a small amount
of original issue discount (typically—though not always—less than 3%).88
Local governments today rarely issue deeply discounted bonds, including
“zero coupon bonds,” on which no interest is paid and all return on
investment is in the form of original issue discount, though they did so
more frequently in the early 1980s.89 Zero coupon bonds are the
economic equivalent of CABs and have largely been replaced by CABs,
primarily because of differences in their treatment in calculating
compliance with debt limits.90
California and Texas school districts often issue general obligation
bonds at a premium, meaning the investor pays more than the face
amount of the bond and the yield on the bond is lower than the nominal

interest compounded through the conversion date. These raise the same concerns as CABs, though
to a lesser degree, and are not addressed separately in this article. See SCOTT, supra note 49, at 22
(describing convertible CABs, and indicating they are a variation of CABs).
86. See 2015–2016 L.A. CTY. CIV. GRAND JURY, CAPITAL APPRECIATION BONDS
AND OTHER SCHOOL BOND DEBT: CONSEQUENCES OF POOR FINANCIAL PRACTICES FINAL
REPORT 105 (2016) [hereinafter L.A. CTY. CIV. GRAND JURY REPORT], http://grandjury.
co.la.ca.us/pdf/LOSANGELESCOUNTY2015-2016CIVILGRANDJURYFINALREPORT.pdf
[https://perma.cc/C25B-8ELF] (“CABs are a repayment structure similar to both U.S. Savings
Bonds and what in the mortgage industry is called a ‘balloon loan,’ where all principal and interest is
due at maturity.”); see also ORANGE CTY. GRAND JURY, SCHOOL BONDS, supra note 83, at 7
(explaining the interest on a CAB is not paid until maturity). Principal and interest are sometimes
paid near maturity for bonds subject to mandatory sinking fund redemption. See supra note 76
(explaining this concept).
87. Glossary of Municipal Securities Terms: Maturity Value, MUN. SEC. RULEMAKING BD.,
http://msrb.org/Glossary/Definition/MATURITY-VALUE.aspx [https://perma.cc/BJB2-6LMQ].
88. See CDIAC PRIMER, supra note 30, at C-18 (noting bonds with discounts in excess of two
or three percent are “deep discount bonds”).
89. See Alan Walter Steiss, New Financing Instruments for State and Local Capital Facilities, PUB.
BUDGETING & FIN., Fall 1988, at 24, 28 (indicating zero coupon municipal bonds were introduced
in the late 1970s and became popular soon thereafter); Robert Metz, Market Place: Zero-Coupon
Municipals, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 31, 1982), http://www.nytimes.com/1982/03/31/business/marketplace-zero-coupon-municipals.html [https://perma.cc/5SNA-VPNK] (asserting the first major issue
of zero coupon municipal bonds was in 1982).
90. See infra Section III.C.
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interest rate.91 This results in additional proceeds—sometimes substantial
additional proceeds (particularly in Texas)—from the financing.92
A single issuance of bonds may include both current interest bonds and
capital appreciation bonds, and also a combination of bonds issued at a
discount, at face value, and at a premium.93
III. THE TROUBLE WITH CABS
The use of CABs causes three significant problems. First, CABs allow
local governments to benefit today’s taxpayers at the expense of
tomorrow’s. This is inconsistent with the concept of interperiod equity.
Second, CABs generally have higher yields than current interest bonds.
Lastly, because compounded interest on CABs is not counted against state
constitutional and statutory debt limits—that are based on the total
amount of debt that can be issued or outstanding—the use of CABs
encourages the perception that less debt is being incurred than is, in fact,
the case.
A. CABs Are Incompatible with Interperiod Equity
In the context of local government debt issued to finance capital
projects, “interperiod equity” or “intergenerational equity” is the concept
that the burden of paying taxes to finance a facility should be spread fairly
over the period during which taxpayers benefit from the facility.94
91. See Jason Chung, Selling at Premium: How School Districts Can Pay Costs of Issuance, FIELDMAN
ROLAPP & ASSOCIATES SCH. FIN. NEWS (Oct. 2012) (on file with author) (“For many years
California school districts have generated extra upfront cash from their bond proceeds by
purposefully inflating their coupon rates for the investors who end up purchasing these premium
bonds.”); TEX. BOND REVIEW BD., CAB SUMMARY REPORT 1 (2016), www.brb.
state.tx.us/pub/lgs/fy2016/CABs%20Summary%202016.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5V3M-5AVU]
(describing the practice of issuing general obligation bonds in the form of CABs at a premium).
92. California law does not permit premium to be used for project costs. CAL. EDUC. CODE
§ 15146 (Deering 2016). While there has been criticism of the practice, premiums have been
sometimes used to pay issuance costs. Chung, supra note 91; Letter from Kamala D. Harris, Att’y
Gen., State of Cal., to Wendy H. Wiles, Robert E. Anslow & Jeffrey A. Hoskinson, Bowie, Arneson,
Wiles & Giannone (Mar. 11, 2011) (on file with author). Texas law permits premium to be used for
any costs related to the purpose for which the bonds were issued. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN.
§ 1201.042(d)(4) (West 2013). Furthermore, Texas law caps the principal amount of school district
general obligation refunding bonds at the principal amount of the bonds being refinanced. See infra
Section IV.F. for discussion of how this encourages the use of premium CABs.
93. TBRB, 2016 REPORT, supra note 28, at 11, 41, 106.
94. RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE & PEGGY B. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND
PRACTICE 693 (4th ed. 1984); M. David Gelfand, Seeking Local Government Financial Integrity Through
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Achieving interperiod equity is one of the justifications for financing
capital projects by borrowing, rather than by requiring, current taxpayers
to pay the full cost of a facility that will be used for many years.95 But
interperiod equity also is violated if future taxpayers are required to pay a
disproportionate share of the cost of a project.96
Spreading the costs of facilities fairly over their lives encourages an
optimal, or closer to optimal, level of investment in capital improvements.
Requiring facilities to be paid for with current revenues is likely to result in
too few capital improvements.97 Conversely, “the ability to shift the costs
forward may . . . induce elected officials to incur too much debt,” because
“they can get the credit for the new project immediately, while the blame
for the additional taxes needed to pay off the debt will be borne by their
successors.”98
Because property taxes to pay debt service on general obligation bonds
generally are not levied until near the time these amounts must be paid,
any structure—under which the bulk of the debt service is not due until at
or near maturity (a “back-loaded” structure)—disproportionately burdens

Debt Ceilings, Tax Limitations, and Expenditure Limits: The New York City Fiscal Crisis, the Taxpayers’ Revolt,
and Beyond, 63 MINN. L. REV. 545, 550-51 (1979).
95. MUSGRAVE & MUSGRAVE, supra note 94, at 693–94; Maria Emilia Freire, Managing
External Resources, in MUNICIPAL FINANCES: A HANDBOOK FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 325, 327
(Catherine Farvacque-Vitkovic & Mihaly Kopanyi, eds. 2014); Richard Briffault, Foreword: The
Disfavored Constitution: State Fiscal Limits and State Constitutional Law, 34 RUTGERS L.J. 907, 917 (2003);
Gelfand, supra note 94, at 550–51; Lori Raineri & Darien Shanske, Municipal Finance and Asymmetric
Risk, 4 BELMONT L. REV. 65, 69 (2017). Using debt to spread the cost of a project over its life is not
a new idea. See JOHN A. FAIRLIE, MUNICIPAL ADMINISTRATION 330 (1910) (“At the present time
the municipal debts are incurred for the erection of permanent works, so as to distribute the cost of
construction over the period for which the works will be in existence.”).
96. Gelfand, supra note 94, at 550.
97. See GRANT A. DRIESSEN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30638, TAX-EXEMPT BONDS: A
DESCRIPTION OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT DEBT 1 (2016) (noting paying for facilities
when they are built “is likely to result in a less than optimal rate of public capital formation”); Raineri
& Shanske, supra note 95, at 69 (arguing if capital projects are funded only with current revenue, large
capital projects “could hardly ever be built”).
98. Briffault, supra note 95, at 917–18; see also ROBERT S. AMDURSKY ET AL., MUNICIPAL
DEBT FINANCE LAW: THEORY AND PRACTICE 207–08 (2nd ed. 2013) (observing local officials have
incentives to over utilize debt); Gelfand, supra note 94, at 549–51 (providing historical context around
the need for debt limitations and indicating that future taxpayers are the primary beneficiaries of debt
ceilings); Stewart E. Sterk & Elizabeth S. Goldman, Controlling Legislative Shortsightedness: The Effectiveness
of Constitutional Debt Limitations, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 1301, 1322–24 (1991) (“[A]s courts dealt with
legislative attempts to evade constitutional restrictions, judicial opinions, too, reflected the view that
constitutional limitations were necessary to retrain legislative tendencies to incur too much debt.”).
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future taxpayers.99 Long-term capital appreciation bonds—on which no
debt service (including interest on compounded interest) is paid until at or
near maturity—take this to an extreme. In the case of the 2011 Poway
Transaction, for example, taxpayers will pay nearly $1 billion between 2033
and 2051 on $105 million of debt ($126 million of proceeds including
principal and original issue premium) for upgrades and modernization of
schools;100 it is not hard to imagine that the facilities will again need to be
modernized even before the first debt service payment is made.
Even if, as appears to be the case in some instances, school districts use
CABs to try to maintain substantially level tax rates throughout the life of
the debt, interperiod equity may be compromised. First, even if their tax
rates are not higher because assessed valuations rise over time as projected,
future taxpayers may pay a disproportionate share of the facilities financed
with the CABs, particularly if assessed valuations were projected to rise
more rapidly than inflation101 or if already outstanding debt that matures
in the near—to medium—term is also factored into the calculation.
Second, future taxpayers bear the risk that property values will not increase
as expected or (less likely) will decline. Should this occur, they will have to
pay higher tax rates for debt service, and the district’s ability to issue
additional debt may be constrained as long as the CABs remain
outstanding.102
If total debt service on school district general obligation bonds were
fully capitalized into real estate values—that is, if property values
accurately reflected the cost of future debt service—CABs would not
disproportionately burden future property owners.103 Scholars have
reached varying conclusions about the extent to which taxes are capitalized

99. An increase in debt service over time that reflects expected inflation would be appropriate;
otherwise future taxpayers would be paying less in real dollars than current taxpayers are. The
concern is with structures in which a substantial portion of debt service is delayed.
100. POWAY UNIFIED SCH. DIST., 2011 OFFICIAL STATEMENT, supra note 14, at 1–2, 5, 13–
14.
101. This is more likely to occur in states that do not impose strict limits on assessed valuation
increases.
102. Requiring future taxpayers to bear the risk of assessed valuations growing more slowly
than projected is particularly troubling because school district officials have incentives to make
optimistic assumptions about future property value growth. See infra Section IV.E.
103. See Clayton P. Gillette, Direct Democracy and Debt, 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 365, 392
(2004) (noting greater capitalization results in more closely aligned interests of current and future
taxpayers).
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into home values, though it appears that some capitalization occurs.104
However, even if property taxes are fully capitalized in some
circumstances, it is unlikely that the possibility of higher future taxes—
because of a school district’s debt structure—would be. Information
about a school district’s general obligation debt level and debt service
structure is not typically provided to prospective purchasers by realtors or
title companies, making it unlikely that this information would be known
to a buyer.105
Furthermore, even if a buyer had this information, he or she would also
need information about current assessed valuations in the school district
and would need to either obtain and evaluate existing projections of
assessed valuation growth and the assumptions on which they were
based,106 or develop his or her own projections in order to predict the
impact of debt service on future tax rates. To obtain a complete picture, a
prospective purchaser would have to gather and analyze information for
every local government within the territory of which the property was
located.107 The difficulties and uncertainties of determining the impact of
CABs on future tax rates make it unlikely that they are fully capitalized.108
104. See id. (noting some capitalization results in a limited ability to pass on tax increases to
new buyers); see also WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS: HOW HOMES VALUES
INFLUENCE LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE AND LAND USE POLICIES 47–
51 (2005) (discussing various capitalization studies and concluding that anticipated taxes are fully
capitalized).
105. While information about a school district’s debt service structure is available from
documents posted on the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board’s (MSRB’s) Electronic Municipal
Market Access website (emma.msrb.org), or by making a public records request to the district, it is
not likely that many prospective purchasers do this.
106. See DAYTON, supra note 42, at 75 (noting assessed valuation projections may not be
available at all). A new California law that requires school boards to obtain assessed valuation
projections that take into consideration those of the county assessor, in advance of calling a bond
election, (see infra note 308 and accompanying text) and the new requirements imposed by AB 182
and HB 114, with respect to CABs, may help to some extent (particularly the provisions of HB 114).
107. There could be several of these, including a county, a city, a community college district,
and other special districts in addition to the school district.
108. Even William Fischel, who argues in favor of capitalization, notes that capitalization is
100% only for anticipated taxes. FISCHEL, supra 104, at 49–51. While Fischel was discussing
anticipated changes in the law, the same concept would apply if potential purchasers could not
determine the amount of the future taxes. See also Darien Shanske, Public Tax Dollars for Private
Suburban Development: A First Report on a National Phenomenon, 26 VA. TAX REV. 709, 751–58 (2007)
(arguing Mello-Roos assessments are not fully capitalized). Mello-Roos taxes, which are authorized
under the Mello-Roos Community Facilities Act of 1982 (codified at California Government Code
Sections 53311–53368.3), are more likely than a school district’s general obligation debt structure to
be fully capitalized. Notices of Mello-Roos assessments that include information about the rate and
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B. CABs Cost More
Yields often are higher on CABs—and zero-coupon bonds—than on
current interest bonds, particularly in a low interest rate environment like
that of recent years. There are three reasons for this. First, because CABs
do not receive any payment on the bonds until at or near maturity,
investors are more concerned about adverse changes in the condition of
the issuer or changes in market conditions that would negatively affect the
price at which the investor would be able to sell the CABs in the secondary
market, and about the risk of default (though defaults of local government
bonds, and particularly of general obligation bonds, are extremely rare).109
Second, when interest rates are low, investors demand a higher rate
because, in effect, the interest earned on CABs is automatically reinvested
in the same bond (and cannot be invested in anything else).110 Since
investors expect interest rates to go up in the period during which the
bonds are outstanding, they charge a premium for the foregone investment
opportunities. Third, there generally are fewer buyers for CABs in the
secondary market than there are for CIBs, which means that it may be
harder to sell them.111 Based on a review of data for the last business day

method of apportionment of the tax are filed with the county recorder as a special lien and hence
could be found in a title search. See CAL. GOV’T. CODE § 53328.3 (Deering 2008) (stating the notice
of lien must be filed with the county recorder); see also CAL. STS. & HIGH CODE §§ 3114.5, 3115.5
(Deering 2008) (establishing the information required to be included in the filing and noting the lien
will continue in full force and effect until the tax obligation has been paid and satisfied).
Furthermore, because Mello-Roos taxes cannot be based on assessed values—and instead are based
on features like lot size, whether or not the lot is developed, or the purpose of the lot—potential
buyers typically have the information necessary to calculate their maximum tax rates based on the
formula in the recorded notice. But see FISCHEL, supra 104, at 49–50 (describing a 1994 study by A.
Quang Do and C. F. Sirmans concluding that Mello-Roos taxes are fully capitalized). Shanske argues
against the study’s conclusion. Shanske, supra, at 755–58.
109. Only ninety-five issuers defaulted on bonds rated by Moody’s Investors Service
(one of the three entities rating municipal bonds) between 1970 and 2014, and of these, only eight
involved general obligation bonds (though four of these occurred in 2012 and 2013). US Municipal
Bond Defaults and Recoveries, 1970–2014, MOODY’S INVESTORS SERV., 10 (July 24, 2015),
https://www.moodys.com/researchdocumentcontentpage.aspx?docid=PBM_1006917
[https://
perma.cc/7CAJ-SRCH]. This compares to a total of 15,400 ratings at the end of 2014, 8,600 of
which were ratings on general obligation bonds. Id. at 6.
110. MUN. SEC. RULEMAKING BD., ABOUT ORIGINAL ISSUE DISCOUNT BONDS 3,
http://www.msrb.org/msrb1/pdfs/Original-Issue-Discount-Bonds.pdf
[https://perma.cc/L76FFM5G].
111. James Ramage, As Spread for Zeros Shrink, Debate on Their Value Grows, THE BOND BUYER
(Mar. 8, 2013, 1:43 PM), http://www.bondbuyer.com/issues/122_47/muni-investors-see-yield-inzero-coupon-bonds-as-activity-picks-up-1049482-1.html [https://perma.cc/63LD-PU5E] (quoting
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of March and September from 1996 to 2015, in the vast majority of cases,
AAA-rated CABs had higher yields than comparable CIBs, and in the
most extreme case, 1.18% higher yields.112
In addition, the interest on CABs compounds over many years, which
increases the overall cost, though not—absent the higher yields described
in the preceding paragraph—the present value of the stream of debt
service payments. Issuers generally pay approximately $2 to $3 of debt
service for every $1 of principal on CIBs.113 In contrast, issuers
reportedly pay between $3.50 and $23 for every $1 of principal on
CABs.114 The ratio of proceeds to debt service would be lower for bonds
issued at a premium. For the top one-hundred most expensive CABs
outstanding in Texas as of August 31, 2016, districts paid between $2.85 to
$10.87 of debt service for every $1 of proceeds, as compared to less than
$2 for the typical CIB.115
C. CABs Conceal the Full Amount of Debt
As discussed in this section, interest that compounds on CABs is not
counted against state constitutional and statutory debt limits even though,
once it compounds, there is no substantive reason to distinguish the
interest from the original principal. Failing to count compounding interest
for debt limit purposes is likely to be contrary to the expectations of
voters, gives the impression to the public (and to school board members
Matt Fabian of Municipal Market Advisors) (stating CABs (referred to as “zeros” in the article) lack
broad investor demand).
112. The Municipal Market Monitor (TM 3), NonCall and Zero Yield Curves as of
09/30/2015 (2016) (on file with author). There were some instances in which yields on AAA-rated
CABs were the same or slightly lower than the rate on AAA-rated CIBs with the same term (up to
0.06% and primarily for one, two, and three-year bonds). Id. The difference in interest rates for
CABs and CIBs varies depending on the term of the bond and changes from day to day. In the very
high interest rate environment of the early 1980s, interest rates on CABs and zero-coupon bonds
were lower than those on comparable CIBs. See infra note 138 and accompanying text.
113. Cal. S. Governance & Fin. Comm., A.B. 182 School Bonds Bill Analysis (Revised)
(July 11, 2013), 2013–2014 Leg., Reg. Sess., at 2 (Cal. 2013), available at http://leginfo.
legislature.ca.gov/faces/billAnalysisClient.xhtml?bill_id=201320140AB182 [https://perma.cc/J8VKV2B4]; see Lovett, supra note 12 (reporting average school bonds usually cost two or three times what
was initially borrowed in repayment); see also Weikel, supra note 12 (“Most school bonds . . . require
roughly $2 to $3 to be paid back for every $1 borrowed.”).
114. See Cal. S. Governance & Fin. Comm. A.B. 182 School Bonds (Revised) (July 11, 2013),
2013–2014 Leg., Reg. Sess., at 2 (Cal. 2013), available at http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/
faces/billAnalysisClient.xhtml?bill_id=201320140AB182 [https://perma.cc/XYX4-98N2] (indicating
the debt to principal rations for CABs varies widely).
115. TBRB, 2016 REPORT, supra note 28, at 106–08.
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and officials) that less debt is being incurred than actually is, and, in effect,
allows issuers to circumvent these limits. This is particularly concerning in
situations—such as that of California and Texas school district general
obligation bonds—where voter approval of debt is required.116
Compounding interest on CABs is not counted against limits on the
amount of debt that can be issued or outstanding, such as the amounts
authorized by voters in Texas and California and the limit on debt as a
percentage of assessed valuation in California.117 This exclusion is such a
fundamental component of the CAB that it is included in the definition of
“Capital Appreciation Bonds” published by the MSRB—a self-regulatory
organization created under federal securities laws to regulate the municipal
bond market—which states that:
[B]ecause the investment return is considered to be in the form of
compounded interest rather than accreted original issue discount [as it would
be for a zero-coupon bond] . . . only the initial principal amount of a CAB
would be counted against a municipal issuer’s statutory debt limit.118

In Texas, ballot propositions and election orders are required to include
the “principal amount” of the bonds,119 and premium—used to pay costs
of the project for which the bonds were issued—is also counted against
the voter-authorized amount.120 In California the “amount” of the bonds
that must be included on the ballot is interpreted to mean the principal
amount.121
However, there is a strong argument that once interest has been added
to the original principal amount of the CABs, it should be treated as debt
Clearly, from a commercial
and counted against debt limits.122

116. CAL. CONST. art. XVI, § 18; TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 3(e); TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN.
§ 45.003(a) (West 2012).
117. See supra Section II.B. for discussion of these limits.
118. Glossary of Municipal Securities Terms: Capital Appreciation Bond, MUN. SEC.
RULEMAKING BD., http://www.msrb.org/Glossary/Definition/CAPITAL-APPRECIATIONBOND-_CAB_.aspx [https://perma.cc/KL84-R3F6]. In contrast, the full amount payable at
maturity is counted for zero coupon bonds. Id.
119. TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. §§ 3.009(b)(3), 52.072(e)(1)(A) (West Supp. 2016).
120. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 1201.042(e) (West Supp. 2016).
121. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 15122 (Deering 2013). In California, original issue premium cannot
be used to pay project costs. CAL. EDUC. § 15146 (Deering 2016).
122. In Texas, where premium—used to pay costs of the project for which the bonds were
issued—is already counted against the debt limit (as described in Texas Government Code Section
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perspective, compound interest is treated as new debt as it accrues, in turn
attracting its own interest;123 and, not surprisingly, under accrual basis
accounting—which recognizes receipts and obligations when they are
incurred—the interest on CABs is treated as a liability as it compounds.124
Most companies and government utilities in the U.S. use accrual
accounting.125 Financial statements filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) are presumed to be misleading or inaccurate
if they are not prepared in accordance with generally accepted accounting
principles,126 which require accrual accounting because it provides “a
better basis for assessing the entity’s past and future performance than
information solely about cash receipts and payments . . . .”127 Under the
Internal Revenue Code, taxable income of large corporations is generally
required to be determined on an accrual basis.128 Under standards
promulgated by the Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB),
government-wide financial statements—which show information about

1201.042(e)); interest should be included only to the extent doing so does not result in doublecounting.
123. See DAVID C. GARLOCK, ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF DEBT
INSTRUMENTS 20 (6th ed. 2014) (“In effect, the lender is making one or more additional loans to the
borrower by letting the accrued interest remain unpaid, and so charges interest on these additional
loans.”).
124. See FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING
CONCEPTS NO. 8, CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR FINANCIAL REPORTING ¶ OB17 (2010)
[hereinafter FASB STATEMENT NO. 8] (describing accrual accounting as showing the effects of
transactions on the economic condition of the entity at the time the effects occur, notwithstanding
the timing of cash payments).
125. See GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT NO. 34, BASIC
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS—AND MANAGEMENT’S DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS—FOR STATE AND
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, at Preface (1999) [hereinafter GASB STATEMENT NO. 34] (explaining
“[m]ost governmental utilities and private-sector companies” utilize accrual accounting, which
reports all revenues and costs for current and long-term assets).
126. SEC, 17 C.F.R. § 210.4-01(a)(1) (2016).
127. FASB STATEMENT NO. 8, supra note 124, ¶ OB17; see also FIN. ACCOUNTING
STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING CONCEPTS NO. 6, ELEMENTS OF
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS ¶ 134 (1985) (describing accrual accounting and related concepts, and
explaining that accrual accounting provides information that cannot be obtained by cash basis
accounting); D. EDWARD MARTIN, ATTORNEY’S HANDBOOK OF ACCOUNTING, AUDITING AND
FINANCIAL REPORTING §§ 2.04(3), 3.02(5) (4th ed. 2015) (stating the accrual basis of accounting
“has been developed to provide the most accurate picture of an entity’s operations”).
128. 26 I.R.C. §§ 446, 448 (2016); see also DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, INTERNAL REVENUE
SERVICE, PUBLICATION 538: ACCOUNTING PERIODS AND METHODS 9–10 (Dec. 2012),
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-prior/p538--2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/7CYJ-XG48].
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the governmental entity as a whole—are prepared on an accrual basis.129
Further, treating the interest on capital appreciation bonds differently from
the original issue discount on zero coupon bonds—even though they are
functionally the same—values form over substance.
The California Debt and Investment Advisory Board (CDIAC) has
indicated that California local governments should include the full accreted
value of CABs as “debt outstanding” in annual debt transparency
reports,130 suggesting they view compounded interest as debt.
The Texas Bond Review Board (TBRB) noted, in its local government
annual reports for 2011, 2012, and 2013, that debt was understated
because CABs were reported at their initial principal amount rather than
their maturity value. 131 This statement was dropped from the reports
beginning in 2014, presumably because data on maturity values of CABs
also were included in those reports.132 The disclaimer for the Texas

129. GASB STATEMENT NO. 34, supra note 125, ¶¶ 6(b)(1), 12(e), 16. Under GASB
standards, local governments also prepare fund financial statements, which have a shorter-term focus
and are intended to demonstrate compliance with budgets and legal and contractual requirements. Id.
¶ 6(b); see also GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., WHITE PAPER: WHY
GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTING AND FINANCIAL REPORTING IS – AND SHOULD BE –
DIFFERENT 7 (2013) (noting fund accounting focuses on control and accountability over public
money and on whether there are sufficient resources in the short-term). GASB requires the use of a
“modified accruals basis” in the fund financial statements for funds used to account for activities that
are governmental in nature (like those related to general obligation bonds). Id. ¶ 79. Thus, interest
on CABs is not reflected until it is due in this portion of the financial statements. See id. at Preface
(using the example of taxes collected at the time they are needed to pay debt service as an example of
the short-term focus of fund financial statements); see also CAL. DEP’T OF EDUC., SCH. FISCAL
SERVS. DIV., CALIFORNIA SCHOOL ACCOUNTING MANUAL 101-3 (2016), http://www.cde.
ca.gov/fg/ac/sa/documents/csam2016complete.pdf [https://perma.cc/F387-YNLY] (indicating
un-matured interest on long-term debt is recorded when it is due under the modified accrual basis).
130. CAL. DEBT AND INV. ADVISORY COMM’N, GUIDANCE ON COMPLYING
WITH SB 1029, at 4 (Dec. 4, 2016), http://www.treasurer.ca.gov/cdiac/sb1029/guidance.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BH87-ADFC].
131. TEX. BOND REVIEW BD., LOCAL GOVERNMENT ANNUAL REPORT 2011, at 10 (2012),
http://www.brb.state.tx.us/pub/lgs/fy2011/2011LocalARFinal.pdf [https://perma.cc/9ZJG-7PT9];
TEX. BOND REVIEW BD., LOCAL GOVERNMENT ANNUAL REPORT 2012, at 10 (2013),
http://www.brb.state.tx.us/pub/lgs/fy2012/2012LocalARFinal.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GEQ3RLDK]; TEX. BOND REVIEW BD., LOCAL GOVERNMENT ANNUAL REPORT 2013, at 10 (2014)
[hereinafter TBRB, 2013 REPORT], http://www.brb.state.tx.us/pub/lgs/fy2013/2013LocalARFinal.
pdf [https://perma.cc/VW3C-YUR5].
132. TEX. BOND REVIEW BD., LOCAL GOVERNMENT ANNUAL REPORT 2014, at 10–11
(2015), http://www.brb.state.tx.us/pub/lgs/fy2014/2014LocalARFinal.pdf [https://perma.cc/
FNT2-T39C]; TEX. BOND REVIEW BD., LOCAL GOVERNMENT ANNUAL REPORT 2015, at 11–12
(2015) [hereinafter TBRB, 2015 REPORT], http://www.brb.state.tx.us/pub/lgs/fy2015/
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Comptroller’s “Texas Transparency” website—which provides
information about state and local government finances—indicates that
compounded interest on CABs is not included in the debt figures provided
on the site,133 which suggests that readers, absent the disclaimer, might
otherwise assume they were.
IV. REASONS LOCAL GOVERNMENTS ISSUE CABS
General obligation bonds are especially likely to be issued as CABs.
Virtually all CABs issuances in California and Texas in 2015 were general
obligation bonds.134 There are several possible reasons for this. In many
cases, fees and charges can be raised without voter approval or with the
approval of a lower percentage of voters than would be required to issue
general obligation bonds.135 Perhaps the political cost of raising property
taxes is higher than those of raising fees or charges, or possibly even other
types of taxes (such as sales taxes) that support revenue bonds. Fees,
charges, and other types of taxes generally are not subject to restrictions
comparable to the expected rate limits; this may be another factor making
it less likely that revenue bonds will be issued as CABs.136 Further,
because general obligation bonds are payable from property taxes assessed
specifically for that purpose, and not from other funds of the issuer, there
is a disconnect between the funding of the issuer’s mission and the
payment source for the bonds. That is, because payment of debt service
does not directly affect a school district’s ability to educate students,
officials may be less focused than they otherwise would be on the structure
2015LocalARFinal.pdf [https://perma.cc/2WPP-ANJL]; TBRB, 2016 REPORT, supra note 28, at 11–
12.
https://www.comptroller.texas.gov/
133. Transparency,
COMPTROLLER.TEXAS.GOV,
transparency/local/debt/counties.php [https://perma.cc/3CBU-JXQL].
134. This assessment is based on data from the CDIAC and the TBRB. California 2015
Issuances, supra note 9; TBRB Issuances FY 2007–2015, supra note 9.
135. In California, some charges and fees do not require voter approval. MAC TAYLOR, CAL.
LEGIS. ANALYST’S OFFICE, A LOOK AT VOTER-APPROVAL REQUIREMENTS FOR LOCAL TAXES 3–
5 (2014), http://www.lao.ca.gov/reports/2014/finance/local-taxes/voter-approval-032014.pdf
[https://perma.cc/VQP9-SD68]. Others require approval by a majority of voters. Id. Taxes, other
than property taxes, require approval by either a majority or a two-thirds supermajority of voters,
depending on the nature of the tax. Id.
136. While revenue bond indentures often prohibit the issuance of additional debt, unless the
ratio of projected annual revenues to debt service is at a specified level, these negotiated ratios may
be less likely to impose a real constraint on an issuer’s ability to issue debt. In part, this is because in
many cases, additional expected revenues from the facilities being financed can be included in the
calculation.
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and impact of those payments. In contrast, fees, charges, and other taxes
often can be used to pay both operating and capital costs. In Texas, the
requirement that the principal amount of general obligation refunding
bonds must not exceed the principal amount of the refinanced bonds also
encourages the issuance of general obligation bonds in the form of
premium CABs.137
The following sections discuss several reasons why California and Texas
school districts issue general obligation bonds in the form of CABs. More
than one reason may contribute to an issuance.
A. In Some Instances, CABs Can Result in Lower Overall Debt Service
In some cases, school districts use capital appreciation bonds because
doing so either alone or as part of a transaction that also includes current
interest bonds, results in lower overall debt service.
While this generally is not the case today, in high interest rate
environments—such as in the 1980s—the yield on CABs is lower than on
CIBs because “[t]he investor accepts a somewhat lower rate of return to
lock up a relatively high rate of interest for an extended period of years.
Moreover, the investor has no worries about reinvesting coupon income,
possibly at disadvantageous rates.”138
In some market conditions, using capital appreciation bonds in
conjunction with current interest bonds allows issuers to achieve lower
overall debt service (without violating expected rate limits, or while
maintaining level tax rates or keeping tax rates below levels promised to
voters).139 In circumstances where short-term interest rates are lower
than long-term interest rates, issuing long-term CABs may allow the rest of

137. See infra Section IV.F. (explaining Texas’s requirements for refunding bonds).
138. See Metz, supra note 89 (demonstrating the bond maturity values for long term bonds); see
also Petersen, supra note 83, at 20 (“Long-term original discount bonds attract investors whose
objective is the accumulation of future wealth and who anticipate that their future reinvestment rates
may be lower than present coupon rates.”); see also Scott H. Williamson, Tax-Exempt Zero Coupon Bond
Pricing, 35 NAT’L TAX J. 497, 497 (1982) (“In order for rational investors to be willing to purchase
ZCBs at lower yields than those on equivalent CCBs, there must be some features of ZCBs which are
attractive. Often mentioned is the absence of coupon reinvestment rate risk. This usually implies the
possibility that rates may fall.”); Michael Quint, Credit Markets: Rates Show Little Change, N.Y. TIMES
(June 3, 1982),
http://www.nytimes.com/1982/06/03/business/credit-markets-rates-show-littlechange.html [https://perma.cc/N9RF-JHZ2] (noting the issuer will “automatically reinvest the
interest payments at the stated rate”).
139. See infra Section IV.B. for a discussion of the use of CABs to avoid violating expected
rate limits and Section 0 for discussion of the use of CABs to avoid near-term tax rate increases.
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the bonds to be issued as shorter-term CIBs (rather than the alternative of
issuing only longer-term CIBs) to take advantage of lower interest rates on
shorter-term debt.140 More than 80% of the issuances of general
obligation CABs by California school districts in 2015 were part of a
transaction that also included CIBs.141 However, absent concerns about
keeping tax rates below a specified level, similar or even lower overall debt
service often could be achieved by issuing only shorter-term current
interest bonds—or even a combination of shorter-term and longer-term
current interest bonds (but no capital appreciation bonds)—because
interest would not be compounding and because, in most circumstances,
rates on CABs are higher than on CIBs.142
B. CABs Allow Districts to Provide Facilities While Avoiding Near-Term Tax
Increases
School districts and other issuers structure debt with payments
concentrated at the end of the repayment schedule—long-term CABs are
an extreme example—to provide facilities without increasing taxes for
current property owners. Because taxes generally are not levied to pay
principal and interest on general obligation bonds until near the time such
debt service must be paid,143 interest that compounds over the life of a
CAB is not reflected in tax rates until near maturity.
This use of CABs can be motivated by the political benefits of
providing new facilities to current taxpayers without requiring them to pay
the cost of the facilities, the desire to keep promises to voters about tax
rates, or the inclination to maintain substantially level tax rates. Because
these reasons all are ultimately efforts to avoid tax rate increases, albeit
viewed from different perspectives, all three are addressed under this
heading.
140. See CDIAC Webinar – Bond Math II Transcript (Oct. 7, 2011), http://www.treasurer.
ca.gov/cdiac/webinars/2011/20111007/transcript.pdf [https://perma.cc/5WYD-YG67] (explaining
it is possible to structure the amount of bond allocated between CABs and CIBs in a way that lowers
the overall cost for the entire bond issue).
141. This percentage calculation is drawn from data provided by the CDIAC. California
Issuances 2015, supra note 9; See also CDIAC Webinar – Bond Math II Transcript, supra note 140 (noting
usually CABs are issued with CIBs); L.A. CTY. CIV. GRAND JURY REPORT, supra note 86, at 103,
111–12 (indicating that of the twelve CABs evaluated, only one was not issued in combination with
CIBs).
142. See supra Section III.B. for discussion of interest rates on CABs.
143. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 15250 (Deering 2013); TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 26.04
(West Supp. 2017).
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Providing Facilities to Today’s Taxpayers at the Expense of
Tomorrow’s. There is a significant incentive for locally elected officials to
use debt to provide immediate benefits to constituents while ignoring
potentially negative long-term issues that may eventually surface.144 Even
if current constituents are concerned about the future burden, that
concern will be merely one factor of many that contributes to their
decision on whether to re-elect local officials.145
Elected officials may be reluctant to propose bond measures that
increase tax rates because of the political ramifications of doing so. This
may be one reason that “they postpone maturity dates [on] the principal
for a long period of time.”146 Issuing CABs, and, thus, postponing
interest payments, simply takes this one step further. Moody’s Investors
Service has indicated that one reason school districts use CABs is to
respond to taxpayer requests “to build new schools and maintain low
student-to-teacher ratios” without significantly increasing taxes.147
The voters, school board members, and district officials who authorize
and issue bonds today, and whose children benefit from the facilities
financed with the proceeds of those bonds, likely will not pay the debt
service on CABs that do not mature for many years. As stated by the
then-treasurer of California, “The average tenure of a school
superintendent is about three and a half years, so they aren’t going to be
around in most instances to worry about paying that off. . . . Nor will the
voters, probably, that enacted it in the first place.”148
It appears that concern about keeping property tax rates low (at least in
the near term) was one reason that, in 2009, the California legislature
eliminated a requirement that general obligation new money bonds, issued
by California local governments under the state’s Government Code, have
144. AMDURSKY, supra note 98, at 207–08 (“[L]ocal officials, who will want to demonstrate
constructive activity to constituents before the next election, have incentives to overutilize debt,
paying scant attention to long-term adverse effects.”).
145. Id. at 208.
146. JACKSON L. FLANIGAN ET AL., MANAGING SCHOOL INDEBTEDNESS: A COMPLETE
GUIDE TO SCHOOL BONDING 83–84 (2d ed. 1995).
147. Yvette Shields, Illinois School Districts’ Use of CABs Not all Negative, Moody’s Reports, THE
BOND BUYER (Apr. 17, 2007), http://www.bondbuyer.com/news/-268763-1.html [https://perma.
cc/N4RP-T442].
148. Shane Shifflett, Sharon Pieczenik, & Trey Bundy, Controversial School Bonds Create ‘Debt for
the Next Generation’, REVEAL (Jan. 31, 2013), https://www.revealnews.org/article/controversialschool-bonds-create-debt-for-the-next-generation [https://perma.cc/896D-QEXN] (quoting Bill
Lockyer, former treasurer of California).
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substantially level debt service,149 which had the effect of making it easier
for school districts to issue longer term CABs. The California Governor’s
Office of Planning and Research indicated that the amendments would
allow issuers to “use increasing property values to keep property taxes at
their lowest possible rate through final maturity of the bonds.”150 Put
another way, district officials would be able to defer debt service until a
time further in the future when they projected that assessed valuations
would be higher and the same property tax rate would generate more
revenues than today.151
Keeping Promises to Voters. School district officials use CABs to
keep promises to voters about both tax rates and capital projects. When
voters are asked to approve a school district bond measure in California,
the bond measure must include the purposes for which the bonds are to
be used.152 Texas law similarly requires that the document ordering the
election and the ballot proposition describe the purposes of the bonds.153
California law also requires that voters be provided the “best estimate” of
the tax rate for the bonds in the first year after bonds are expected to be
issued, the year after the last bonds are expected to be issued, and the year
in which the rate is estimated to be highest.154 While there is not a
comparable requirement in Texas (where either the estimated tax rate or
the maximum interest rate—but not both—must be included in the
149. See Assemb. B. 1388, 2009–2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2010) (changing the law to
eliminate the requirement that bonds “be structured to amortize so that the maximum annual debt
service payment . . . does not exceed the minimum annual debt service payment by more than 10%”).
150. CAL. GOVERNOR’S OFFICE OF PLANNING AND RESEARCH, A.B. 1388 ENROLLED BILL
REPORT 4 (2009).
151. See infra Section IV.E. for discussion of assumptions about future assessed valuation
growth.
152. See CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA, § 1(b)(3)(B) (mandating the proposition presented to the
voters include “[a] list of the specific school facilities projects to be funded”); see also CAL. EDUC.
CODE § 15122 (Deering 2013) (requiring “the purposes for which the proceeds of the sale of bonds
are to be used” to be printed on the ballot box in a bonds election); CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 53410(a),
(b) (Deering 2011) (mandating any local bond measure subject to voter approval include a statement
“indicating the specific purposes of the bond”).
153. TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. §§ 3.009(b)(2), 52.072(e)(1)(B) (West Supp. 2016).
154. CAL. ELEC. CODE § 9401(a) (Deering 2016), amended by Assemb. B. No. 1194, 2017–2018
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2017). The 2017 amendment to the California Election Code will require the
statement to include the “best estimate of the average annual tax rate required to fund the proposed
bond measure for the duration of its debt service” and to “identify the final fiscal year in which the
tax is anticipated to be collected[,]” instead of providing the tax rate for the first year after the first
bonds are expected to be issued and the first year after the last bonds are expected to be issued.
Assemb. B. No. 1194, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2017).
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election order),155 districts do, at least in some cases, make information
about the expected tax rate impact of the bonds available on their web
sites.156 In some instances (probably often), districts do not indicate that
actual tax rates for debt service may be higher than expected.
Even where not legally required, districts make promises and provide
information to voters about expected tax rates and planned capital
projects. School districts opted to include language promising no increase
in taxes on approximately 15% (13 out of 88) of the school district bond
measures on local ballots in California in 2010.157 Furthermore, as was
noted in the prior paragraph, some school districts present the projected
tax impact of bond measures on their web sites and in information
provided to the community.158 Some districts also provide information
(with varying degrees of detail) on their web sites about the projects to be
financed.159
155. TEX. ELEC. § 3.009(b)(5) (West Supp. 2016).
156. See Alvin ISD Trustees Call for November Bond Election, ALVIN INDEP. SCH.
DIST., http://www.alvinisd.net/site/default.aspx?PageType=3&ModuleInstanceID=29749&ViewID
=7b97f7ed-8e5e-4120-848f-a8b4987d588f&RenderLoc=0&FlexDataID=27512&PageID=23385
[https://perma.cc/UCY4-GAR4] (noting tax rates would increase by a maximum of $.083 per $100
of assessed valuation if a $245 million bond issue were passed by voters in November 2015); see
also YISD Estimated Property Calculator, YSLETA INDEP. SCH. DIST., https://bisweb.yisd.net/
YISDPropertyTaxCalculator/YISDPropertyTaxCalculator.aspx
[https://perma.cc/C5DJ-44V9]
(allowing anyone who visits the website to calculate the effect of the November 2015 bond measure
on property taxes).
157. This percentage is calculated based on data provided by the Institute for Social Research
Center for California Studies at California State University, Sacramento. INST. FOR SOC.
RESEARCH CTR. FOR CAL. STUDIES CAL. STATE UNIV. SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA COUNTY, CITY
AND SCHOOL DISTRICT ELECTION OUTCOMES, 2010 ELECTIONS, 17–30 (2010),
http://elections.cdn.sos.ca.gov/county-city-school-district-election-results/2010/school-districtreport-2010.pdf [https://perma.cc/R48H-6MHZ]. Notably, there were significantly fewer measures
containing such language in 2012 (8 out of 136) and in 2014 (6 out of 163). INST. FOR SOC.
RESEARCH, 2012 ELECTIONS, supra note 49, at 19–38; INST. FOR SOC. RESEARCH, 2014 ELECTIONS,
supra note 49, at 19–39.
158. See Alvin ISD Trustees Call for November Bond Election, supra note 156; see also YISD Estimated
Property Calculator, supra note 156 (providing a way to calculate the effect of the November 2015 bond
measure on property taxes); Measure S, HERMOSA BEACH CITY SCH. DIST.,
http://hbcsd.org/District/23252-Untitled.html [https://perma.cc/GYP2-XBX5] (indicating the tax
rate for a 2016 bond measure would be $29.50 per $100,000 of assessed value).
159. See Alvin ISD Trustees Call for November Bond Election, supra note 156 (describing projects to
be financed with bond proceeds); see also Bond Site Maps, HERMOSA BEACH CITY SCH. DIST.,
http://hbcsd.org/District/23249-Untitled.html [https://perma.cc/8EQJ-TG88] (providing site
maps for Hermosa Beach City School District and descriptions of projects at each site); Bond Projects
by Campus, YSLETA INDEP. SCH. DIST., https://www.yisd.net/domain/2563 [https://perma.cc/
A5A3-LXPK] (identifying bond-funded school district projects by campus).
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While property taxes must be raised if necessary to pay debt service on
any bonds that are issued—and districts are not legally obligated to
complete all the projects described—at least some district officials appear
to view these types of statements as commitments that they endeavor to
keep. For example, the official statement for CABs issued by the San
Diego Unified School District in 2012 to refinance outstanding debt
stated:
Due to lower assessed valuations of taxable property within the District than
were projected at the time of issuance of the outstanding bonds, the District
currently projects that the tax rate necessary to pay outstanding bonds . . .
will exceed the tax rate [identified in the materials for the bond measure
passed by the voters] unless actions are taken to restructure the outstanding
bonds. The District is undertaking the plan of restructuring described below
in order to reduce debt service in fiscal years 2011–12 and 2012–13 and
establish a tax rate reserve, which will allow the District to continue to
implement its capital improvement program through the issuance of
additional authorized general obligation bonds within the tax rate
identified . . . .160

The desire to keep tax rates at or below promised levels appears to be one
of the primary reasons for the controversial Poway Transaction.161 Napa
Valley Unified School District also reportedly issued CABs for this
reason.162
District officials may feel greater pressure to keep promises to voters by
issuing CABs when assessed values for real property have declined—or
have not increased—as anticipated at the time a bond measure was passed.
This situation is more likely to arise when districts base tax rate estimates

160. SAN DIEGO UNIFIED SCH. DIST., $65,434,441.70 SAN DIEGO UNIFIED SCHOOL
DISTRICT 2012 GENERAL OBLIGATION REFUNDING BONDS (DEDICATED UNLIMITED AD
VALOREM PROPERTY TAX BONDS) SERIES R-1, $56,869,830 SAN DIEGO UNIFIED SCHOOL
DISTRICT 2012 OBLIGATION REFUNDING BONDS (DEDICATED UNLIMITED AD VALOREM
PROPERTY TAX BONDS) SERIES R-2, http://emma.msrb.org/EP611468-EP478356-EP878739.pdf
[https://perma.cc/K99D-RQDN].
161. ESI INT’L, INC., POWAY UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT BUILDING FOR SUCCESS
PROGRAM FINANCING BOND TRANSACTION PROPOSITION C, SERIES B REPORT OF
INVESTIGATION 12–14, 16, 19 (2013), http://voiceofsandiego.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/
51002d5d73afa.pdf.pdf [https://perma.cc/CK8S-4MQ5].
162. Shifflett, Pieczenik, & Bundy, supra note 148; see infra note 314 (noting Napa Valley
Unified School District has since refinanced some of its CABs).
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and planned projects on optimistic assumptions about assessed valuation
growth.163
Maintaining Substantially Level Tax Rates. Property owners “find
it easier to live with a more or less stable tax rate.”164 Significant changes
in property tax rates from year to year would make planning difficult, and
likely would result in angry and frustrated taxpayers and possibly higher
delinquency rates. Thus, school districts typically endeavor to impose a
relatively level tax burden over time.165
The use of CABs assists school districts in maintaining substantially
level tax rates in two ways. First, in situations where school districts have
outstanding general obligation bonds that have relatively high debt service
payments in the near term, a district may issue CABs with maturity dates
after all or most of the existing bonds have matured so that debt service
payments on the new bonds (and hence collection of the related property
taxes) begin after debt service on existing ones has declined significantly or
ended. Second, school districts may assume that assessed valuations will
have risen by the time that debt service payments need to be made years in
the future, meaning that more revenues will be generated at the same tax
rate.166
C. School Districts Use CABs to Continue to Issue Debt Without Violating Limits
on Expected Tax Rates
Both California and Texas law impose expected rate limits, which
prohibit school districts from issuing general obligation new money bonds
if the expected tax rate to pay debt service on all the district’s general
obligation debt (in Texas), or on all the general obligation bonds approved
under the California 55% Regime at a specific election (in California)

163. See infra Section IV.E. (discussing the assumptions about future assessed valuation
growth).
164. MUSGRAVE & MUSGRAVE, supra note 94, at 693.
165. Seth Rosenblatt, Proposed Restrictions on School Bonds Would Harm Districts, EDSOURCE
(Mar. 24, 2013), http://edsource.org/today/2013/proposed-restrictions-on-school-bonds-wouldharm-districts/29136#.UpeIaKX7W8Q [https://perma.cc/H6HT-AZYN]; see also Diana Lambert &
Phillip Reese, Each $1 from Bonds to Cost Schools $18, SACRAMENTO BEE (Oct. 17, 2012, 7:06 AM),
http://web.archive.org/web/20130515133055/http://www.sacbee.com/2012/10/17/4917486/eac
h-1-from-bonds-to-cost-schools.html [https://perma.cc/3U8N-XFAX] (indicating the Folsom
Cordova Unified School District Superintendent stated that the district had structured its bonds so
that taxpayers would pay a similar amount in taxes for twenty-five years).
166. See infra Section IV.E. for discussion of assessed valuations and related assumptions.
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exceeds a statutory limit.167 These restrictions are a major reason
California and Texas school districts issue CABs. As Fitch Ratings—one
of the three entities providing credit ratings on municipal bonds—noted,
“[B]y delaying repayment, CABs provide a financing vehicle when tax rate
or debt level restrictions would prevent issuance of current interest
bonds.”168 Fitch Ratings also indicated that tax rate limits or promised
tax rates—combined with growing enrollments and stagnant or declining
assessed valuations—or both, were among the primary reasons for
increased CABs issuances in California and Texas.169 In a white paper
generally critical of longer-term CABs, the Los Angeles County Treasurer
and Tax Collector conceded that districts might need to use them to avoid
violating the expected rate limit.170
When debt service on a school district’s outstanding general obligation
bonds—or, in California, general obligation bonds approved under the
California 55% Regime at a particular election—is already at the expected
rate limit, the district cannot legally issue current interest bonds because
even a small amount of debt service before some of the outstanding bonds
are repaid would cause the district to exceed the limit in any year.
However, a district can issue CABs that mature after some or all the
existing debt matures and annual debt service declines.
School districts that cannot issue CIBs without violating the applicable
expected rate limit have the option of issuing lease revenue bonds or
certificates of participation (COPs), or not issuing debt at all; some do
exercise these options.171 Lease revenue bonds and COPs are paid from

167. CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 15268, 15270(a) (Deering 2013); TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN.
§ 45.0031(a) (West 2012); see also supra Section II.B., “Limits on Expected Tax Rates” (discussing the
expected rate limits in Texas and California).
168. Fitch Ratings Press Release, supra note 9.
169. Id.; see also Aman Batheja, Swelling School Districts Find a Costly Way to Grow Within State Debt
Limits, TEX. TRIB. (Aug. 29, 2014, 6:00 AM), https://www.texastribune.org/2014/08/29/fastgrowing-school-districts-use-controversial-fi/ [https://perma.cc/JH79-5V2P] (“[I]n recent years,
critics have raised concerns as some fast-growing school districts have used the bonds to sidestep the
50-cent test and sharply increase their overall debt.”).
170. Letter from Mark Saladino, Treasurer & Tax Collector, Cty. of L.A., to Sch. Fin. Prof’ls
2 (May 16, 2011), https://ttc.lacounty.gov/Proptax/docs/White%20Paper%20-%20School%20GO
%20Bonds.pdf [https://perma.cc/UXK9-M384].
171. The percentage of school district and community college district general obligation debt
that had been authorized by voters, but had not been issued, grew dramatically during the economic
downturn in California.
CDIAC, VOTER APPROVED GENERAL OBLIGATION BONDS:
AUTHORIZED BUT UNISSUED, supra note 46, at 2.
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district general funds (primarily state aid),172 and are used as a means to
avoid voter authorization requirements and other restrictions that apply to
general obligation bonds.173 However, districts prefer to issue general
obligation bonds rather than these alternatives for two reasons. First,
unlike property taxes, other revenues generally cannot be increased to
accommodate the debt service, and school districts prefer to use this finite
resource to operate the district and educate students. In fact, districts
sometimes obtain voter authorization to refinance lease revenue bonds
and COPs with general obligation bonds. For example, Mojave Unified
School District issued voter-approved bonds to repay COPs in 2015.174
Second, interest rates on lease revenue bonds and COPs are typically
higher because they are riskier to investors, generally have lower credit
ratings than general obligation bonds,175 and, in Texas, because the Texas
Permanent School Fund cannot guarantee these obligations.176
School districts in California (unlike those in Texas) also can obtain
another voter approval and issue bonds that otherwise cause debt service

172. See CAL. DEBT ADVISORY COMM’N, CDAC NO. 93-8, GUIDELINES FOR LEASES AND
CERTIFICATES OF PARTICIPATION 50 (1993) [hereinafter CDAC GUIDELINES] (discussing the
difficulties school districts have generating funds locally and noting that school districts receive the
bulk of funding from the state); Shama Gamkhar & Jerome Olson, Factors Affecting School District
Choice of Bonds, NAT’L TAX ASS’N PROC. OF ANN. CONF. ON TAX’N, Fall 2002, at 396, 405 (stating
Texas school district lease revenue “bonds can be repaid only with state aid (not taxes)”). To use
lease revenue bonds or certificates of participation, which are functionally the same, the third party
acquires property or the school district leases property to a third party and the third party subleases
the property back to the district at a rental rate that is sufficient to make payments on the lease
revenue bonds or COPs issued by the third party. CDIAC PRIMER, supra note 30, at 126, 185–86.
173. CDAC GUIDELINES, supra note 172, at 50; Craig L. Johnson & John Mikesell, Certificates
of Participation and Capital Markets: Lessons from Brevard County and Richmond Unified School District, PUB.
BUDGETING & FIN., Fall 1994, at 41, 42, 52; see also Gamkhar & Olson, supra note 172, at 405
(finding districts that are less likely to win a bond election are more likely to issue lease revenue
bonds).
174. MOJAVE ISD 2015 OFFICIAL STATEMENT, supra note 76, at Cover, 2, 7.
175. CDAC GUIDELINES, supra note 172, at 16; Shama Gamkhar & Mona Koerner, Capital
Financing of Schools: A Comparison of Lease Purchase Revenue Bonds and General Obligation Bonds, PUB.
BUDGETING & FIN., Summer 2002, at 21, 24, 30–32; see Gamkhar & Olson, supra note 172, at 397;
see also Beverly S. Bunch & Tina Smith, The Viability of Lease Purchases as a Means for Funding School
Facilities, 27 J. OF EDUC. FIN. 1049, 1058–60 (2002). Bunch and Smith also found that issuance costs
were higher, but noted that the savings from avoiding a bond election would partially offset these
costs. Id. at 1058–59.
176. 19 TEX. ADMIN. CODE Ann. §§ 33.65(b)(4), (7), (10), (12), (d)(1) (2017).
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to exceed the expected rate limit,177 though they may be reluctant to or
may not be able to do so in time to meet their funding needs.
When school districts perceive a need to issue bonds quickly, they may
issue CABs if they would otherwise be legally prevented from issuing
general obligation bonds at all. As was noted in Section IV.B., school
district officials place importance on completing the capital projects that
they have told voters they will undertake. If a project is already under way,
and additional funds are needed to complete it, the pressure is likely even
more intense. Further, many districts have pressing infrastructure needs
that must be met to serve students in a safe, comfortable environment.
For example, repairing or replacing leaking roofs was listed in dozens of
California school district bond measures in 2014 as a use of bond
proceeds.178 When California districts have issued bond anticipation
notes (short-term interim debt) that are maturing, they have to either issue
general obligation bonds to repay them (even if they must do so in the
form of CABs) or repay them from the general fund (something they may
not be able to do without compromising the education provided to
students, if at all.)179 Districts also issue CABs to take advantage of state
and federal assistance programs that are of limited duration or to take
advantage of market conditions, such as low interest rates or low
construction costs.180 For example, the Santa Ana Unified School
District in California indicated it used CABs to take advantage of low
construction costs, low interest rates, and state matching funds to issue
federally subsidized Qualified School Construction Bonds (QSCBs) and
Build America Bonds (BABs), and to build needed school facilities.181
177. TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 3(e); TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 45.0031 (West Supp. 2016);
CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 15268, 15270(a) (Deering 2016).
178. INST. FOR SOC. RESEARCH, 2014 ELECTIONS, supra note 49, at 19–39.
179. One California financial advisor referred to bond anticipation notes as a “financial
weapon of mass destruction” in a discussion of the untenable situation they can create for school
districts. SCOTT, supra note 49, at 172–73 (discussing the dangers of BANs to school districts).
180. See ORANGE CTY. GRAND JURY, SCHOOL BONDS, supra note 83, at 7–8 (noting the use
of CABs allows school districts to take advantage of state matching funds and federal subsidies).
181. Frequently Asked Questions Regarding Capital Appreciation Bonds Related to Measure G,
SANTA ANA UNIFIED SCH. DIST. 1–2, http://www.sausd.us/cms/lib5/CA01000471/
Centricity/Domain/113/FAQ%20on%20Capital%20Appreciation%20Bonds.pdf [http://perma.cc/
77LD-3A33]. While this district’s objective was to keep tax rates near the levels promised to voters
rather than within the expected rate limits, it provides an example of many of the incentives for
districts to issue CABs. QSCBs and BABs were both programs of limited duration (QSCBs had to
be issued within six months after receiving an allocation in California and the BABs program expired
in 2010) that provided a direct federal subsidy to districts that issued taxable bonds. TBRB, 2015
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Poway Unified School District engaged in the interim funding transactions
that it ultimately refinanced in the controversial Poway Transaction to
access state matching funds, avoid cost increases, and complete projects as
quickly as possible.182
Expected rate limits appear to have a disproportionate impact on certain
types of districts. Property-poor districts, which have low assessed
valuation per student, are more likely to be constrained by debt limits that
are based on property values.183 Taxes collected at the expected rate limit
will raise a lower amount of money per student in a property-poor district
than in a wealthier one.184 An unsuccessful bill to amend Texas’s
expected rate limit in 2015 would have increased the cap only for sixty
school districts designated as fast-growing, suggesting that the authors of
the bill believe these districts are particularly affected by the limit.185
Of course, the other side of limits on expected tax rates is that they
impose at least some constraint on future tax rates, because a district
would not legally be able to incur its debt in such a form that it expected
debt service to exceed those limits in any year. Even though school
districts have incentives to make optimistic assumptions about future
valuation growth,186 districts are unlikely to make assumptions that have
absolutely no basis.
D. School Districts May Issue CABs to Meet the Needs of a Rapidly Growing
Population
Rapidly growing districts may be especially inclined to issue CABs. As
Fitch Ratings expressed, “For rapidly growing areas, the primary appeal [of

REPORT, supra note 132, at 16; see CAL. EDUC. § 12001.6(C)(13) (Deering 2013) (stating QSCB
allocations go back to the state after six months).
182. ESI INT’L, INC., supra note 161, at 11, 14–15. While the district undertook Poway
Transaction to avoid exceeding a tax rate promised to voters rather than to comply with the expected
rate limit, the principle is the same.
183. ORANGE CTY. GRAND JURY, SCHOOL BONDS, supra note 83, at 11–12; c.f. Eric J.
Brunner & Kim Rueben, Financing New School Construction and Modernization: Evidence from California,
54 NAT’L TAX J. 527, 535–36 (2001) (discussing the same principle as would apply to the expected
rate limit in the context of a limit on overall debt as a percentage of assessed value).
184. ORANGE CTY. GRAND JURY, SCHOOL BONDS, supra note 83, at 11–12, 32.
185. Tex. H.B. 506, 84th Leg., R.S. (2015); see Tex. H. Research Org., Bill Analysis, Tex.
H.B. 506 84th Leg., R.S., at 3 (2015); see also infra Section IV.D. for discussion of fast-growing
districts.
186. See infra Section IV.E. (discussing incentives to make optimistic assumptions about future
valuation growth and the impact of incorrect assumptions).
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CABs] is that needed capital improvements can be funded immediately,
but the repayment burden is shared with the larger future population.”187
Furthermore, because there is generally a lag between increases in
property values and increases in assessed valuations,188 student numbers
may grow before the larger overall population is reflected in higher
assessed valuations. The Author’s/Sponsor’s Statement of Intent for
HB 114 indicated that “[i]n recent years, Texas school districts and local
government entities have increasingly turned to CABs because our
growing populations are demanding new facilities and capital development
that far outpace our local wealth and resources. Usually, immediate
development is needed but there are limited other financing
options. . . .”189 Of the top ten public school districts in Texas based on
maturity amount of CABs outstanding as of August 31, 2015,190 seven
had enrollment growth (expressed as a percentage) above that of the state
as a whole over the ten-year period from state fiscal year 2005–2014 and
six had enrollment growth far above that of the state as a whole for that
same period.191 This suggests a correlation between rapid growth and the
use of CABs.
187. Fitch Ratings Press Release, supra note 9.
188. Byron F. Lutz, The Connection Between House Price Appreciation and Property Tax Revenues
48 FIN. & ECON. DISCUSSION SERIES, Sept. 12, 2008, at 6–8, 12. The lag between increases in
property values and assessed values likely is higher in California, where there are strict limits on
increases in assessed values absent a sale of the property.
189. S. Comm. on Fin., Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B. 114, 84th Leg., R.S. (2015).
190. TBRB, 2015 REPORT, supra note 132, at 41.
191. Statewide enrollment grew 17.2% over this period. See TEX. EDUC. AGENCY,
POCKET EDITION: 2004–05 TEXAS PUBLIC SCHOOL STATISTICS (2005), https://rptsvr1.
tea.texas.gov/perfreport/pocked/2005/pocked0405.pdf [http://perma.cc/8SBG-8ZRZ] (showing
the statewide enrollment during the 2004–2005 school year); TEX. EDUC. AGENCY,
POCKET EDITION: 2013–14 TEXAS PUBLIC SCHOOL STATISTICS (2014), http://tea.texas.gov/
communications/pocket-edition/ [http://perma.cc/K72Z-QH2X] (detailing statewide enrollment
for the 2013–2014 school year). Over the same period, enrollment growth for each district, based on
data in the indicated official statements, was as follows: Leander: 78.9%; Wylie: 77.8%; Forney:
96.5%; Grand Prairie: 20.8%; Ennis: 4.4%; Frisco: 175.8%; Denton: 55.4%; Schertz-Cibolo-Universal
City: 82.8%; Galena Park: 9.7%; and Irving: 10.1%. LEANDER INDEP. SCH. DIST., OFFICIAL
STATEMENT DATED JUNE 4, 2015 app. B-2 (2015), http://emma.msrb.org/ER894732-EA566660EA962666.pdf [http://perma.cc/X6C9-EJEV]; WYLIE INDEP. SCH. DIST., OFFICIAL STATEMENT
DATED OCTOBER 7, 2015 app. B-2 (2015), http://emma.msrb.org/EP875003-EP677587EP1079225.pdf [http://perma.cc/JY4P-S3N4]; FORNEY INDEP. SCH. DIST., OFFICIAL STATEMENT
DATED JUNE 25, 2014 app A-1 (2014), https://emma.msrb.org/EA616377-EA482625EA879233.pdf [http://perma.cc/M82D-QH2Y]; GRAND PRAIRIE INDEP. SCH. DIST., OFFICIAL
STATEMENT DATED FEBRUARY 24, 2015 app. B-1 (2015), http://emma.msrb.org/EP847035EP655527-EP1057221.pdf [http://perma.cc/N24N-6JFS]; ENNIS INDEP. SCH. DIST., OFFICIAL
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It may be that rapidly growing districts are endeavoring to achieve
interperiod equity through their use of CABs. Because, in many cases,
they are building to accommodate a student population that they expect to
continue to grow, they may be trying to protect today’s population from
having to pay for more infrastructure than it needs or can use, while
providing for the needs of a larger future population. These districts also
may expect that their use of CABs will result in substantially level tax rates
because they expect assessed valuations to grow with the population.
Unfortunately, if growth does not occur as expected, it will be a small
population in the future that bears the brunt of the decisions being made
today.
The limits on expected tax rates discussed above are a significant force
pushing rapidly growing districts to issue CABs rather than CIBs. As an
official of a district in Texas that grew from 7,200 students in 1994 to
36,750 in 2014 put it, “Yes, [using CABs] costs more, but when you’re at
[the expected rate limit] and another 1,200 children come in, we think
‘Where are we going to put them?’”192 They are not, however, the sole
reason CABs are used. In the State of Texas, for example, of the forty
fastest-growing districts, eleven are at the $0.50 rate cap and nine are even
lower, within $0.05 of it.193 The other half of these districts presumably
STATEMENT DATED APRIL 14, 2015 app B-3 (2015), http://emma.msrb.org/ER867185-EA558387EA954554.pdf [http://perma.cc/922N-JYZF]; FRISCO INDEP. SCH. DIST., OFFICIAL STATEMENT
DATED NOVEMBER 10, 2015 app. B-4 (2015), http://emma.msrb.org/EP887477-EP687043EP1088743.pdf [http://perma.cc/WZ5G-CY5J]; DENTON INDEP. SCH. DIST., OFFICIAL
STATEMENT DATED AUGUST 4, 2015 app. B-1 (2015), http://emma.msrb.org/EA740427EA580195-EA976220.pdf [http://perma.cc/GNY5-MCUZ]; SCHERTZ-CIBOLO-UNIVERSAL CITY
INDEP. SCH. DIST., OFFICIAL STATEMENT DATED SEPTEMBER 18, 2014 app. B-2 (2014),
http://emma.msrb.org/EP831962-EP644201-EP1045821.pdf
[http://perma.cc/AE26-L62A];
GALENA PARK INDEP. SCH. DIST., OFFICIAL STATEMENT DATED FEBRUARY 7, 2007 app. B-2
(2007), http://emma.msrb.org/MS256496-MS231804-MD451932.pdf [http://perma.cc/27PPMX4V]; GALENA PARK INDEP. SCH. DIST., OFFICIAL STATEMENT DATED JUNE 24, 2015 app. B-3
(2015), http://emma.msrb.org/ER902702-ER705499-ER1107106.pdf [http://perma.cc/L7MMX8JA]; IRVING INDEP. SCH. DIST., OFFICIAL STATEMENT DATED DECEMBER 10, 2014 app. B-1
(2014), http://emma.msrb.org/ER825383-ER638136-ER1039800.pdf [http://perma.cc/78ST4N72]. These districts ranged in size from less than 6,000 students to more than 45,000 students in
state fiscal year 2014.
192. Batheja, supra note 169 (quoting Ellen Skoviera, Assistant Superintendent for Business
and Operations, Leander Independent School District); see Fitch Ratings Press Release, supra note 9
(discussing the benefits to growing districts that come with CABs, but also identifying potential
risks); see also Lisheron, supra note 12 (noting CABs have been used to accommodate expected
“exploding growth” in student numbers).
193. MOAK, CASEY & ASSOCS., FINDING BALANCE: A GUIDE TO ENROLLMENT, DEBT, &
STATE FACILITIES SUPPORT, A REPORT BY THE FAST GROWTH SCHOOL COALITION TO THE 85TH
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are using CABs for reasons other than to comply with the expected rate
limit.
E. The Impact of Incorrect Assumptions About Growth in Assessed Valuations
When assessed valuations decline or do not increase as was projected at
the time a bond measure was proposed, districts are more likely to issue
CABs to maintain tax rates at desired levels or to comply with expected
rate limits while completing promised projects. In California, statewide
assessed valuations declined in fiscal year 2009–2010 for the first time
since the State Board of Equalization began keeping records in 1933.194
This likely contributed to the significant increase in the aggregate principal
amount of CABs issued by California school districts—both in absolute
terms and as a percentage of all general obligation bonds issued—from
2007 to 2011.195 Furthermore, districts and their advisors have incentives
to use, and sometimes do use, optimistic assumptions about assessed
valuation growth when providing estimated tax rates in order to increase
the likelihood that the bond measure will pass.196
Equally, if not more troubling, district officials and their advisors have
incentives to use aggressive assumptions about assessed valuation growth
when evaluating whether taxes for debt service are expected to be within
TEXAS LEGISLATURE 10 (2016), http://fastgrowthtexas.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/
FastGrowth_Interim_Report_2016.pdf [http://perma.cc/284N-75DV].
194. Press Release, Cal. Bd. Of Equalization 4th Dist. – Los Angeles, Total Statewide
Property Values Decline (Aug. 25, 2009), http://www.boe.ca.gov/news/2009/73-09.pdf
[http://perma.cc/G2ZR-QF7K].
195. While the aggregate principal amount of general obligation bonds issued by California
school districts declined from approximately $6.6 billion in 2007 to $5.1 billion in 2011, the principal
amount of these bonds issued as CABs increased from approximately $540 million in 2007 to
$1.1 billion in 2011. CDIAC data includes 192 school district general obligation bond issuances (80
of which included CABs) in 2007 and 274 school district general obligation bond issuances (89 of
which included CABs) in 2011. See Jensen, Calif. Capital Appreciation Bonds Have Unintended
Consequences, supra note 13 (describing declining real estate values as a reason that some school
districts issued CABs); see also Cal. Assemb., Bill Analysis (Sept. 5, 2013), Assemb. B. 182, 2013–14
Leg., Reg. Sess., at 3 (Cal. 2013) (noting CABs became more popular after home prices declined); Cal.
S. Educ. Comm., Bill Analysis (June 24, 2013), Assemb. B. 182, 2013–14 Leg., Reg. Sess., at 3–4
(Cal. 2013) (attributing increased use of CABs to lower housing prices); L.A. CTY. CIV. GRAND JURY
REPORT, supra note 86, at 127 (indicating all twelve of the school districts that issued CABs reviewed
in the report had experienced slower assessed valuation growth or even assessed valuation decline).
196. See SCOTT, supra note 49, at 23 (describing an example of aggressive assumptions about
assessed valuation growth). As of 2017, California law requires school boards calling for a bond
election to obtain assessed valuation projections that take into consideration projections of the
county assessor. Assemb. B. 2116, 2015–16 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2016).
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the rates previously promised to voters and whether a bond issuance
complies with the expected rate limit. Using aggressive assumptions
allows districts to issue more bonds, and the fallout of higher tax rates will
land on future, rather than current, officials and taxpayers.
California law (unlike Texas law) does not provide guidance on what
assumptions are to be used in projecting assessed valuations for purposes
of calculating compliance with the expected rate limit.197 The Orange
County Grand Jury reviewed assumptions about estimated tax rates for
three school districts in the county that issued CABs; it concluded that all
three had assumed unreasonably high growth in assessed valuations, and
that the taxpayers in these districts were likely to have to pay taxes in
excess of the expected rate limit in the future.198
In Texas, if a district’s actual tax rate is higher than projected and
exceeds the expected rate limit, that district is subject to a lower limit in
the future.199 The impact of this penalty is not clear. On one hand, it
may encourage districts to use conservative assumptions about assessed
valuation growth or to use historic, rather than projected assessed
valuation, in determining compliance.200 Most districts in Texas use the
historic test.201 On the other hand, it may encourage some districts to use
financing structures in which the bulk of the debt service is not due until at
or near maturity—including, at the extreme, long-term CABs—to
postpone the risk of exceeding the limit.

197. A 2010 bill in California would have imposed broad limits on the growth that could be
assumed in projections for determining compliance with the expected rate limit, but it did not pass.
Assemb. B. 2552, 2009–2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2010). While it does not apply directly to
calculating compliance with the expected rate limit, AB 2116 may impact the projections used by
school districts for determining compliance. This bill is discussed supra note 196, and infra note 300
and accompanying text.
198. ORANGE CTY. GRAND JURY, SCHOOL BONDS, supra note 83, at 4.
199. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 45.0031(e) (West 2013).
200. See ORANGE CTY. GRAND JURY, SCHOOL BONDS, supra note 83, at 4 (claiming school
districts would likely not exceed the mandated tax rate if they were conservative in their growth
assumptions for assessed values).
201. For example, data from the TBRB indicates seventy-five school districts issued general
obligation bonds in August 2015. TBRB Issuances FY 2007–2015, supra note 9. Official statements
for sixty of the school districts indicated that the districts had not used projected property values to
satisfy the test, three stated that they had and five were silent. See Texas, ELECTRONIC MUNICIPAL
MARKET ACCESS https://emma.msrb.org/IssuerHomePage/State?state=TX [https://perma.cc/
E8CJ-3ZP8] (providing information for Texas municipal securities issuers including issuers’ official
statements). Official statements for the remaining seven were not available. Id.
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F. Texas Par-to-Par Requirement for Refundings
Texas school districts may not issue general obligation refunding bonds
without obtaining voter approval unless the principal amount of the
refunding bonds is no greater than the principal amount of the bonds
being refinanced.202 This means school districts need to generate original
issue premium to pay costs of issuing the refunding bonds and to pay
interest on the refinanced bonds through their maturity or redemption
date.203 This amount can be significant, particularly for bonds that are
refinanced far in advance of their redemption or maturity date.204 One
way Texas school districts comply with this requirement is by issuing
CABs that generate significant original issue premium.205
G. School District Officials May Not Understand the Impact of CABs
It appears that in some instances, school district boards do not
understand what capital appreciation bonds are, what their impact is, or
even that they are being issued. Many school board members do not have
the experience and background to understand the impact of CABs, at least
not without explanation and guidance from district officials and outside
financial advisors. While school board members frequently are committed,
intelligent, and educated individuals who work hard for their school
districts, the legal qualifications for serving are minimal.206

202. TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 3(e); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 1207.003(b) (West 2012);
see LAWRENCE FIN. CONSULTING LLC, PUBLIC FINANCE UPDATE 1 (2013),
http://www.lfctexas.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/April-2013-Issue.pdf [https://perma.cc/
H424-N8DP] (noting school districts must abide by the par-to-par requirement).
203. See LAWRENCE FIN. CONSULTING LLC, supra note 202, at 1 (describing how CABs are
used by school districts to meet the par-to-par requirement for refunding).
204. See id. (noting the high interest expenses for advance refunded bonds).
205. See id. (claiming school districts must use CABs to cover issuance costs and interest
amounts on advance refunded bonds); see also NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT, WHAT HAPPENED IN
AUSTIN: 10 NEW LAWS THAT MATTER 17–18 (2015), http://www.nortonrosefulbright.
com/files/20150722-what-happened-in-austin-ten-new-laws-that-matter-130804.pdf [https://perma.
cc/B9WL-FBDD] (suggesting the par-to-par test partially explains why “Texas[] school districts are
the largest issuer of capital appreciation bonds”).
206. In California, anyone who is at least eighteen years old, a citizen of California, a resident
of the school district, a registered voter, and not disqualified under the California Constitution or
state law from holding civil office, is eligible. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 35107(a) (Deering 2013). In
Texas, anyone who is a U.S. citizen, at least eighteen years old, has not been determined by a final
court judgment to be mentally incapacitated, has not been convicted of a felony, and has resided in
Texas for twelve months and in the territory where the office is located for six months, is eligible.
TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 141.001(a) (West 2015).
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Further, in many cases, school boards are presented with bond
resolutions that authorize the issuance of both CIBs and CABs; they then
delegate to their officers the decision of which type of bonds will be issued
and the terms of the bonds (within specified parameters).207 These
decisions typically are not made until closer to the time the bonds are sold
and after the board has approved the transaction because market
conditions affect the final structure.
Then California State Treasurer, Bill Lockyer, and California
Superintendent of Public Instruction, Tom Torlakson, noted that school
board members and the public have not always been fully informed about
the costs and risks associated with CABs.208 Some school board members
have stated that they could not recall approving CABs or were not aware
of the impacts of issuing them.209
The failure to count compounded interest against voter-authorized
amounts and against the California limit on total debt as a percentage of
assessed valuation exacerbates the problem by making the true level of
debt created by these bonds less apparent.210
Furthermore, school district officers and employees may not have
sufficient experience to understand the full impact of CABs, at least

207. See Leander Indep. Sch. Dist., Res. Authorizing The Issuance, Sale and Delivery of
Leander Independent School District Unlimited Tax Refunding Bonds, in One Or More Series;
Authorizing Preparation of an Official Statement; Authorizing a Pricing Officer to Approve the
Amount, Interest Rates, Price, Redemption Provisions and Other Terms Thereof and Certain Other
Procedures and Provisions Related Thereto; and Containing Other Matters Related Thereto, at 6
(2015), https://v3.boardbook.org/Public/PublicItemDownload.aspx?ik=37700942 [https://perma.
cc/W7NM-YB2K] (appointing an officer to determine the types of bonds to be issued); San Carlos
Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., Res. No. 8:15/16, at 7 (2015), sancarlos.agendaonline.net/
public/Meeting/Attachments/DisplayAttachment.aspx?AttachmentID=217007&IsArchive=0
[https://perma.cc/LC8F-CPRR] (declaring an authorized officer has the power to approve bonds in
the form of CABs, CIBs or Convertible CABs). Notably, one school district’s bond resolution
granted broad authority to authorized officers to determine the terms of the bonds within
parameters, but specified that CIBs be used to the maximum extent “determined . . . to be in the best
interest of the District . . . .” Merced City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., Res. No. A-75-2015-2016, at 8,
http://www.mcsd.k12.ca.us/files/user/1/file/Board%20of%20Education/2015-16%20Board%20
Meetings/Agendas/10-27-15%20Board%20Meeting%20Agenda.pdf
[https://perma.cc/C6Z8NLYZ].
208. Press Release, Cal. Dep’t of Educ., State Schools Chief Tom Torlakson, State Treasurer
Bill Lockyer Caution School Districts Against Issuance of Capital Appreciation Bonds (Jan. 17, 2013)
[hereinafter Press Release, Cal. Dep’t of Educ.], http://www.cde.ca.gov/nr/ne/yr13/yr13rel12.asp
[https://perma.cc/4823-9MQL].
209. Shifflett, Pieczenik, & Bundy, supra note 148; Lambert & Reese, supra note 165.
210. See supra Section III.C.
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without guidance from outside financial advisors.211 Most cities and
counties have few resources dedicated to debt management, and their
external financial advisors frequently know more about bonds—and even
about the issuer’s own debt portfolio—than the issuers do;212 the same is
likely true of school districts, particularly smaller ones. Even large issuers
Smaller
don’t always understand the agreements they make.213
communities tend to have smaller financial staffs, and the differences in
capacity are likely to impact management of the issuer’s debt.214 An
empirical study of municipal bond sales in Oregon concluded that small
communities pay higher interest rates on their general obligation bonds
than larger communities, all else being equal, and attributed this to them
having more limited staffs with less expertise.215 Smaller school districts
likely confront the same issues—particularly when evaluating a less
common financing structure like CABs.
Recognizing their lack of in-house expertise, school districts and other
local governments often engage an external financial advisor.216 Among
other things, financial advisors assist issuers in developing a financing plan,
211. See SAN MATEO CTY. CIV. GRAND JURY, CAPITAL APPRECIATION BONDS: TICKING
TIME BOMBS 7 (2013), http://www.sanmateocourt.org/documents/grand_jury/2012/bonds.pdf
[https://perma.cc/G6D9-6AZT] (“A southern California school chief business officer lamented the
lack of financial expertise that leaves many districts unqualified to navigate complex bond deals – or
to do business with high-powered financial advisers[:] ‘They’re swimming with the sharks . . . . These
are principals and assistant superintendents of curriculum, and they’re being promoted to the role of
a chief business officer.’”).
212. Monique Moyer, Current Issues Facing Bond Issuers and Their Financial Advisors, MUN. FIN. J.,
Summer 2003, at 17, 18; see also U.S. ADVISORY COMM’N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS,
STATE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO LOCAL DEBT MANAGEMENT 9–11 (1965) [hereinafter U.S.
ADVISORY COMM’N, STATE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO LOCAL DEBT MANAGEMENT] (examining
the difficulty smaller communities have with bonds due to their lack of expertise); Ang & Green,
supra note 77, at 8 (“Furthermore, when municipalities negotiate with investment banks and other
financial intermediaries to issue debt, municipalities often have less expertise and relatively few
resources to guide their decision[-]making. This is detrimental not only to investors, but also to
municipalities themselves.”); Jayaraman Vijayakumar & Kenneth N. Daniels, The Role and Impact of
Financial Advisors in the Market for Municipal Bonds, 30 J. FIN. SERVICES RES. 43, 44 (2006) (stating local
communities often lack the sophistication and knowledge to navigate the debt issuance process and,
therefore, utilize financial advisors to assist them).
213. See Stephan Whitaker, Financial Innovations and Issuer Sophistication in Municipal Securities
Markets 4 (Fed. Res. Bank of Clev., Working Paper No. 14–04, 2014) (identifying this as a contributor
to the Orange County, California and Detroit, Michigan bankruptcies).
214. Bill Simonsen et al., The Influence of Jurisdiction Size and Sale Type on Municipal Bond Interest
Rates: An Empirical Analysis, 61 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 709, 710–11 (2001).
215. Id. at 713–15.
216. Vijayakumar & Daniels, supra note 212, at 44.
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structuring transactions, and negotiating with underwriters.217 In some
cases, financial advisors receive fees that are either contingent on the
closing of the bond financing, tied to the size of the issuance, or both
(though California law prohibits compensation of financial advisors based
on a percentage of the amount of bonds sold).218
Municipal bonds are typically sold to the public through an investment
bank acting as an underwriter.219 The underwriter’s compensation is a
percentage of the total principal amount sold.
The MSRB, which regulates underwriters and other participants in the
municipal securities market, notes that “compensation that is contingent
on the closing of a transaction or the size of a transaction presents a
conflict of interest, because it may cause the underwriter to recommend a
transaction that it is unnecessary or to recommend that the size of the
transaction be larger than is necessary.”220 The same analysis applies to
financial advisors that are compensated in this manner.
While the vast majority of financial advisors and underwriters are
honorable, experienced professionals, there may be instances in which
financial advisors and underwriters encourage school districts to issue
bonds—including CABs—when it is not in their best interest to do so,
either because they are maximizing their compensation or because they are
too focused on their clients’ short-term objectives. Concerns about the
manipulation of local governments by financial advisors led to the passage
of federal legislation in 2010 that required these advisors to register with
the SEC, imposed fiduciary duties on them, and instructed the MSRB to
217. A 2003 study found that using a financial advisor reduced underwriter compensation for
negotiated general obligation bond offerings. Id. at 66.
218. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 53592 (Deering 2011).
219. Bonds are sold in either a competitive or negotiated sale. In a competitive sale, an issuer
sells the bonds to the lowest bidding underwriter. In a negotiated sale, the issuer selects an
underwriter to purchase the bonds on negotiated terms. In both cases, the underwriter then sells the
bonds to investors. Typically, an underwriter in a negotiated sale plays a much more active role in
the transaction than would an underwriter in a competitive sale. Negotiated sales are by far the most
common sale method for California and Texas school district general obligation bonds, based on
data provided by CDIAC. California Issuances 2015, supra note 9; Local Publications – Bond Issuance,
TEX. BOND REV. BD., http://www.brb.state.tx.us/publications_local.aspx#BI [https://perma.cc/
444R-FYDC].
220. MUN. SEC. RULEMAKING BD., RULE G-17 CONDUCT OF MUNICIPAL SECURITIES
AND MUNICIPAL ADVISORY ACTIVITIES 3 (2012) [hereinafter MSRB, RULE G-17],
http://www.msrb.org/pdf.aspx?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.msrb.org%2FRules-and-Interpretations
%2FMSRB-Rules%2FGeneral%2FRule-G-17.aspx%3Ftab%3D2
[https://perma.cc/XQ3WEQ6W].
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regulate them.221 Similar concerns about underwriters have led to
increased regulation of underwriters, including requirements that
underwriters disclose conflicts of interest to issuers.222
V. CALIFORNIA AND TEXAS LEGISLATION LIMITING THE USE OF CABS
A. Opposition to CABs
School districts in California and Texas have issued general obligation
bonds in the form of CABs since at least the 1990s.223 Changes to
California law that took effect in January 2010 eliminated the requirement
that bonds issued under the relevant California Government Code
provisions (including school district bonds with final maturity dates in
excess of twenty-five years) generally had to have substantially level debt
service.224 This had the effect of making it easier for school districts to
issue CABs with final maturity dates later than twenty-five years after the
date of issuance. The percentage of California school district general
obligation bond issuances—consisting in whole or in part of CABs and
with final maturities later than twenty-five years after the date of
issuance—increased significantly beginning in 2010.225
Capital appreciation bonds began receiving negative attention in both
California and Texas in 2012 and 2013. Newspapers and web sites
published articles with titles like: “Risky Bonds Tie Schools to Huge

221. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 975 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o-4) (West 2010) (“[W]ith respect to municipal advisors—
[the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board shall] prescribe means reasonably designed to prevent
acts, practices, and courses of business as are not consistent with a municipal advisor’s fiduciary duty
to its clients[.]”).
222. See MUN. SEC. RULEMAKING BD., RULE G-17, supra note 220, at 2–3 (describing fair
dealing and requiring that underwriters disclose conflicts of interest to issuers).
223. See ELECTRONIC MUN. MKT. ACCESS (EMMA), https://emma.msrb.org/
[https://perma.cc/522H-DPJY] (providing data on the history of CAB issuances).
224. Assemb. B. 1388, 2009–2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2009). There were exceptions under
prior law, including for issuances that made amortization of overall general obligation bond debt
more level. Id.
225. Of school district general obligation issuances that included CABs, the following
percentages had final maturity dates in excess of twenty-five years: 21% in 2007, 33% in 2008, 24% in
2009, 64% in 2010, 72% in 2011, 80% in 2012, 69% in 2013, 70% in 2014, and 58% in 2015; as a
result of the passage of AB 182, final maturities in excess of twenty-five years in 2014 and 2015
would have to be CIBs, CABs issued to refinance outstanding bonds, or CABs qualifying for limited
transition period exceptions. California Issuances 2002–2014 (2015) (unpublished data) (on file with
author); California Issuances 2015, supra note 9.

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2018

47

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 49 [2018], No. 2, Art. 3

410

ST. MARY’S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 49:363

Debt;”226 “California Schools Finance Upgrades by Making the Next
Generation Pay;”227 and “Texas Schools Pass Debt on to the Next
Generation.”228 The California State Treasurer and State Superintendent
of Public Instruction issued a joint letter urging school districts not to
issue any CABs until the state legislature and the Governor completed
their consideration of reform proposals.229 Grand juries in three
California counties investigated the use of CABs in their counties and
issued scathing reports.230
A bill was unsuccessfully introduced in California in 2013 that declared
the legislature’s intent to ban the use of CABs by school districts.231 In
Texas, bills were unsuccessfully introduced in 2013, 2014 and early 2015,
which would have prohibited or limited the use of CABs that are payable
from property taxes.232
While those efforts did not succeed, California law was amended
effective January 2014 to restrict the use of CABs by school districts and
community college districts;233 and Texas law was modified effective
September 2015 to constrain the use of CABs by all local governments.234

226. Weikel, supra note 12.
227. Lovett, supra note 12.
228. Lisheron, supra note 12.
229. Press Release, Cal. Dep’t of Educ., supra note 208.
230. SAN DIEGO CTY. GRAND JURY, SCHOOL DISTRICT DILEMMA: BONDS OR BONDAGE?
(2013),
http://www.sdcounty.ca.gov/grandjury/reports/2012-2013/School_District_Dilemma_
Bonds_Bondage.pdf [https://perma.cc/9EFQ-7Z5F]; SAN MATEO CTY. CIV. GRAND JURY, supra
note 211; SANTA CLARA CTY. CIV. GRAND JURY, OUR SCHOOL DISTRICTS DO NOT NEED ZEROS
(2013), http://www.scscourt.org/court_divisions/civil/cgj/2013/SchoolDistrictZeros.pdf [https://
perma.cc/A9UK-HXGJ]. The Orange County, Contra Costa County, and Los Angeles County
grand juries also released reports on capital appreciation bonds, but not until after AB 182 had
passed. ORANGE CTY. GRAND JURY, SCHOOL BONDS, supra note 83; CONTRA COSTA CTY. CIV.
GRAND JURY, CAPITAL APPRECIATION BONDS (2015), http://www.cc-courts.org/civil/docs/
grandjury/Report_1501_ComplianceAndContinuityCommitteeReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/P8N333S7]; L.A. CTY. CIV. GRAND JURY REPORT, supra note 86.
231. S.B. 685, 2013–2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013).
232. Tex. H.B. 3416, 83d Leg., R.S. (2013); Tex. S.B. 449, 83d Leg., R.S. (2013); Tex. H.B. 83,
83d Leg., C.S. (2013); Tex. S.B. 103, 84th Leg., R.S. (2015); Tex. H.B. 1750, 84th Leg., R.S. (2015);
Tex. H.B. 2099, 84th Leg., R.S. (2015).
233. Community college districts are similar to school districts, but provide two-year tertiary
education. Cal. Cmty. Colls. Chancellor’s Office, Board of Governors, CA.GOV, http://extranet.cccco.
edu/SystemOperations/BoardofGovernors.aspx [https://perma.cc/BJ88-UZ2T].
234. Assemb. B. 182, 2013–2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013); Act of May 26, 2015, 84th Leg.,
R.S., ch. 991, §§ 1–3, sec. 1201.0245, 2015 Tex. Gen. Laws 3517, 3519 (codified at TEX. GOV’T
CODE § 1201.0245).
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B. Limits on CABs in California
California AB 182 took effect in January 2014.235 The legislation
narrowed the parameters within which school districts and community
college districts (but not other local governments) could issue general
obligation new money CABs.236 In particular, the new law reduced the
maximum term for these CABs from forty to twenty-five years,237 and the
maximum interest rate on these CABs from 12% to 8%.238 In addition,
AB 182 added a requirement that general obligation new money CABs
with terms of more than ten years be subject to redemption at the option
of the issuer no later than ten years after their date of issuance. 239 This
means that rather than having to keep its CABs outstanding through their
final maturity, a school district would be able to repay them after ten years,
should it desire to do so, without having to negotiate with bondholders or
obtain their consent. AB 182 also added a requirement that the ratio of
debt service (for CABs, the maturity amount) to principal for a series of
CABs not exceed four to one.240
Like governing boards of all local governments in California, school
boards are subject to open meeting and public notice requirements.241
AB 182 added additional notice and information requirements for school
board approvals of general obligation new money CABs issuances.242
Public notice of the proposed approval of a general obligation new money
CABs issuance must be given for two consecutive school board

235. Assemb. B. 182, 2013–2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013).
236. The State Board of Education may waive these provisions for bonds that refinance bond
anticipation notes issued before December 31, 2013, if certain conditions are met. CAL. EDUC.
CODE § 15144.3 (Deering Supp. 2017).
237. CAL. EDUC. § 15144 (Deering 2013); CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 53508(f), 53508.5
(Deering 2011 & Supp. 2017).
238. CAL. EDUC. § 15143 (Deering 2013); CAL. GOV’T §§ 53508(d), 53508.5, 53531 (Deering
2011 & Supp. 2017).
239. CAL. EDUC. § 15144.2 (Deering 2016); CAL. GOV’T § 53508.5. Presumably, this option
has some cost in the form of higher yields, particularly when interest rates are high, since it creates
the risk that investors will have to reinvest not only earning on, but also principal of, the CABs in
lower yielding securities before the scheduled maturity date of the CABs.
240. CAL. EDUC. § 15144.1 (Deering Supp. 2017); CAL. GOV’T § 53508.5.
241. See CAL. GOV’T §§ 54950–54963 (Deering 2016) (defining “local agency” as including
“school district[s] . . . or any board, commission or agency thereof” and stating the chapter’s
provisions for open and public meetings).
242. These requirements also apply to CIBs that mature more than 30 years after issuance.
CAL. GOV’T § 53508.6 (Deering Supp. 2017).
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meetings,243 and the resolution approved by the school board authorizing
the issuance must include the financing term and time of maturity, the
ratio of debt service to principal, and the estimated change in assessed
value of taxable property in the district over the term of the bonds.244 In
addition, the board must be presented information concerning the overall
cost of the CABs, a comparison to the overall cost of CIBs, the reason
CABs are being recommended, and a copy of required disclosures
regarding underwriter conflicts of interest.245
The provisions of AB 182 do not apply to bonds that are issued to
refinance existing debt. In California, school districts may issue general
obligation refunding bonds only if they result in overall debt service
savings246 and do not mature any later than the bonds that are being
refinanced.247
C. Limits on CABs in Texas
Texas HB 114 took effect September 1, 2015.248 HB 114 applies to
CABs issued by local governments and secured by ad valorem taxes.249
HB 114 reduced the maximum term of CABs from forty to twenty
years.250 The new law also added a provision that allows CABs to be
issued only if the total debt service on all the local government’s general
obligation CABs will be no more than 25% of total debt service on all the
local government’s outstanding general obligation bonds.251
Texas local government boards, like those in California, are subject to
open meeting and public notice requirements.252 HB 114 imposed
additional informational requirements for the issuance of CABs.253
Specifically, governing boards must receive information about the total

243. CAL. EDUC. § 15146(b)(2) (Deering 2016); CAL. GOV’T § 53508.5.
244. CAL. EDUC. § 15146(b)(1)(E) (Deering 2016); CAL. GOV’T § 53508.5.
245. CAL. EDUC. § 15146(c) (Deering 2016); CAL. GOV’T § 53508.5.
246. CAL. GOV’T § 53552 (Deering 2011).
247. Id. § 53553(e).
248. Act of May 26, 2015, 84th Leg., R.S., ch. 991, §§ 1–3, sec. 1201.0245, 2015 Tex. Gen.
Laws 3517, 3519 (codified at TEX. GOV’T CODE § 1201.0245).
249. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 1201.0245(b) (West Supp. 2017).
250. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 45.001(b) (West 2012); TEX. GOV’T § 1201.0245(b)(1) (West
Supp. 2017).
251. TEX. GOV’T § 1201.0245(g) (West Supp. 2017).
252. TEX. GOV’T §§ 551.001–551.146 (West 2017 & Supp. 2017).
253. Act of May 26, 2015, 84th Leg., R.S., ch. 991, § 1, sec. 1201.0245, 2015 Tex. Gen. Laws
3517, 3519 (codified at TEX. GOV’T § 1201.0245).
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debt service to maturity, the fees to be paid to financing team members
and other outside vendors, the projected tax impact and assumptions on
which the projected tax impact is based.254 The governing board also
must determine whether there are any potential conflicts of interest with
any of the professionals involved in the bond issuance.255 Amended
Texas law also requires that local governments post information about the
proposed issuance and existing debt, including the information described
in the two preceding sentences, to their websites and update the
information about outstanding debt and total debt service regularly.256
As of September 1, 2017, general obligation refunding bonds are
exempted from the requirements of HB 114.257 HB 114 prohibits local
governments from extending the maturity date of CABs, including by
refinancing them, unless the extension reduces the amount of debt service
payable through maturity or in other limited circumstances.258 Unlike
California law, Texas law does not otherwise prohibit extending the
maturity of refinanced general obligation bonds and allows refunding
transactions that do not result in debt service savings if the governing
body of the issuer makes a finding that the issuance is in the best interests
of the issuer.259
D. Comparing the Two Approaches
There are significant similarities between the California and Texas CAB
legislation. Both reduce the maximum term of capital appreciation
254. TEX. GOV’T § 1201.0245(b)(2) (West Supp. 2017).
255. Id. § 1201.0245(b)(3).
256. Id. §§ 1201.0245(b)(4), (d).
257. Act of May 22, 2017, 85th Leg., R.S., ch. 529, § 1, sec. 1201.0245(j), 2015 Tex. Sess. Law
Serv. (codified at TEX. GOV’T § 1201.0245(j)). The amendment addressed unintended consequences
of HB 114, such as prohibiting issuers that were already over the 25% limit from issuing refunding
CABs unless the refunding brought the issuer below the limit, even if the refunding resulted in a
lower debt service attributable to CABs and debt service savings, with limited exceptions.
258. TEX. GOV’T §§ 1201.0245(h), (i) (West Supp. 2017). But note that refunding bonds
issued under Chapter 1207 of the Government Code are not subject to Section 1201.0245, as recently
amended. Act of May 22, 2017, 85th Leg., R.S., ch. 529, § 1, sec. 1201.0245(j), 2015 Tex. Sess. Law
Serv. (codified at TEX. GOV’T § 1201.0245(j)).
259. TEX GOV’T. § 1207.008 (West 2012). However, refunding bonds guaranteed by the
Texas Permanent School Fund Bond Guarantee Program cannot have a later final maturity date than
the bonds they are refinancing and must result in present value debt service savings. 19 TEX.
ADMIN. § 33.65(d)(2)(C) (2017). Most Texas school district bonds are guaranteed by this program.
See TEXAS PERMANENT SCHOOL FUND DISCLOSURE STATEMENT, supra note 32 and accompanying
text.
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bonds,260 likely in response to concerns about the higher cost of CABs
and possibly, to some extent, to address concerns about interperiod equity
(though this remains an issue even with the shorter terms). Both include
additional information requirements and, while those requirements are not
identical, both require the provision of information about overall debt
service and the assumptions that are being made about growth in assessed
valuations,261 suggesting that these are important for both governing
board members and the public. Further, both endeavor to make the
public more aware of the issuance of CABs and the impact on the district’s
debt service levels and on property taxes. California requires the issuance
of CABs to be discussed at two board meetings for which public notice
has been given and requires certain information be presented to the
board.262 Texas goes further and requires that, in addition to being
presented to the board, information must be posted on the issuer’s website
and updated regularly.263 Both pieces of legislation require disclosure to
the board of conflicts of interest,264 likely in response to concerns that
issuers are being encouraged to issue CABs when it is not in their best
interests to do so.
General obligation refunding bonds need not comply with the new
limitations in either California or Texas.265 This is likely because the
expectation is that refunding bonds are issued only if they result in overall
debt service savings to taxpayers. As noted above, in California this is the
only circumstance in which general obligation refunding bonds can be
issued.266 While Texas law allows refunding transactions that do not
result in debt service savings, the vast majority of refunding transactions
probably create savings for two reasons: (1) it is a requirement for bonds
260. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 15144 (Deering 2013); CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 53508(f), 53508.5
(Deering 2011 & Supp. 2017); TEX. GOV’T § 1201.0245(b)(1) (West Supp. 2017); TEX. EDUC. CODE
ANN. § 45.001(b) (West 2012).
261. CAL. EDUC. §§ 15146(b)–(c) (Deering 2013); CAL. GOV’T § 53508.5; TEX. GOV’T
§§ 1201.0245(b), (d).
262. CAL. EDUC. §§ 15146(b)–(c); CAL. GOV’T § 53508.5.
263. TEX. GOV’T §§ 1201.0245(b), (d).
264. CAL. EDUC. § 15146(c)(4) (Deering 2013); TEX. GOV’T § 1201.0245(b)(3); CAL. GOV’T
§ 53508.5.
265. See Act of May 23, 2017, 85th Leg., R.S. ch. 529, §§1–3, sec. 1201.245(j), 2017 Tex. Sess.
Law Serv. (West) (to be codified at TEX. GOV’T CODE § 1201.245(j)) (exempting refunding CABs
from additional restrictions effective September 1, 2017).
266. See CAL. GOV’T §§ 53552, 53553(e) (Deering 2016) (stating California school districts
may issue general obligation refunding bonds only if they result in overall debt service savings and do
not mature later than the bonds that are being refinanced).
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to be guaranteed by the Texas Permanent School Fund Bond Guarantee
Program; and (2) because if they do not create savings, board members
must make a public determination to proceed despite the increased
costs.267 School districts in California and, in most instances, in Texas,
may not extend the maturity of previously issued CABs.268
One significant difference between the two laws is that the California
limits apply only to school districts and community college districts, while
the Texas limits apply to all local governments.269 This may be because
school districts and community college districts dominate general
obligation bond issuances in California in a way that they do not in
Texas,270 presumably a reflection of the fact that school districts and
community college districts in California can use the California 55%
Regime, while other California local governments must use the California
Two-Thirds Regime.271 In both states, the controversy surrounding
CABs focused on school districts; and school districts were responsible for
267. TEX. GOV’T § 1207.008 (West 2012); 19 TEX. ADMIN. § 33.65(d)(2)(C) (2017). Most
Texas school district bonds are guaranteed by the Texas Permanent School Fund Bond Guarantee
Program.
268. Refunding bonds guaranteed by the Texas Permanent School Fund Bond Guarantee
Program cannot have a later final maturity date than the bonds they are refinancing. 19 TEX.
ADMIN. § 33.65(d)(2)(C). Most Texas school district bonds are guaranteed by this program. See U.S.
ADVISORY COMM’N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, supra note 35.
269. Compare CAL GOV’T § 53508.5 (imposing capital appreciation bond limits on school and
community college districts), with Tex. Gov’t § 1201.0245(b) (West Supp. 2017) (restricting authority
to issue capital appreciation bonds for a broad range of local governmental bodies).
270. School districts and community college districts were responsible for 95.1% of California
local government general obligation bond issuances and 89.5% of the total principal amount of such
bonds issued in 2015. See CDIAC, 2015 SUMMARY, supra note 28, at 2–4 (showing community
college and K–12 school districts issued $13,512,973,914 of $15,095,823,914 in aggregate principal
amount of government general obligation bonds in 409 transactions out of a total of 430 local
government general obligation bond issuance in 2016). School districts and community college
districts were responsible for 57.9% of the outstanding principal amount of debt supported by ad
valorem property taxes in Texas as of August 31, 2015. See 2016 TEX. BOND REV. BD., LOCAL
GOVERNMENT ANNUAL REPORT 5 (2016), www.brb.state.tx.us/pub/lgs/fy2016/2016LocalARFinal.
pdf [https://perma.cc/H3QB-NCUB] (detailing public school and community college districts held
$78,278.3 million of $135,185.1 million in local government debt). While these figures are not
entirely comparable, they suggest that local governments other than school districts and community
college districts, issue a significantly greater proportion of general obligation bonds in Texas than
they do in California.
271. See DAYTON, supra note 42, at 16 (noting only 110 of the 1,147 local educational bond
measures from 2001 through 2014 were presented to voters under the California Two-Thirds
Regime). All Texas local government general obligation bonds are subject to approval by a majority
of residents voting at an election. TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 3(e); TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN § 45.003(a)
(West 2012).
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most of the CABs issued in the five years leading up to the passage of the
relevant legislation.272 Both pieces of legislation are limited to bonds that
are paid from ad valorem property taxes.273
Another notable difference is that Texas legislation focuses on the
issuer’s overall debt portfolio, while California legislation focuses on the
cost of a series of CABs in isolation. Even though both states place limits
on debt service, Texas compares debt service on CABs to overall debt
service, while California evaluates the debt service on each series of CABs
in isolation.274 This is generally consistent with the two states’ approaches
to expected rate limits; the focus in Texas is on overall debt portfolio and
the focus in California is on a more limited universe (a series of bonds in
the case of the ratio of total debt service to principal, and bonds
authorized at a single election in the case of expected rate limits). It is
surprising, though, that the California test looks at the series of bonds on
its own and not in conjunction with all the bonds that are issued at the
same time, or at all the bonds that were authorized at a particular election.
VI. WHAT IS THE SOLUTION?
There are several ways that misuse of CABs could be—and in the case
of AB 182 and HB 114, has been—addressed. This section discusses
several potential solutions, which fall within three broad categories:
prohibiting or restricting the use of CABs; reducing the incentives to issue
CABs; and providing additional information to local governments and
communities, and additional guidance to local governments. While this
discussion is focused on school districts, the analysis also applies to other
local governments.

272. Based on data provided to the author by CDIAC, school districts in California were
responsible for 72.5% of the aggregate principal amount of CABs issued in California during the
period from 2008 to 2012. In Texas, 65.5% of the total principal amount of CABs issued during the
period from state fiscal years 2009 through 2013 were issued by public school districts. See TBRB,
2013 REPORT, supra note 131, at 10 (computing the percentages by adding the public-school district
CAB amount for fiscal years 2009–2013 and dividing that number by the total principal amount of
CABs issued for fiscal years 2009–2013).
273. TEX. GOVT. § 1201.0245(b); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 15140.5 (Deering Supp. 2017); CAL
GOVT. §§ 53506(a), 53508.5 (Deering 2011 & Supp. 2017).
274. Compare CAL. EDUC. § 15144.1 (Deering Supp. 2017) (explaining a method of analysis
that looks at each series of general obligation bonds in isolation), with TEX. GOV’T § 1201.0245(g)
(West Supp. 2017) (describing a method of CAB analysis that takes account all of the issuer’s general
obligation bonds).
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A. Prohibiting or Restricting the Use of CABs
Misuse of CABs could be eliminated by prohibiting or restricting their
use. The focus of these solutions is preventing districts from taking
advantage of incentives to benefit today’s population at the expense of
tomorrow’s, and addressing concerns about the lack of expertise of school
district officials. However, an outright prohibition—or even carefully
drafted restrictions—on the use of CABs could prevent their use in
circumstances where the benefits outweigh the costs (especially when the
expected rate limit or another legal constraint would otherwise prevent the
issuance of debt at all) and likely would have disparate impacts on districts
with different characteristics. These concerns might be addressed by
allowing districts to issue CABs, or CABs outside specified parameters,
with the approval of a state agency, or by providing alternative funding
sources.
Prohibiting the Use of CABs. One means of eliminating the misuse
of CABs is to ban them entirely. School districts in Michigan were banned
from issuing capital appreciation bonds in 1994.275 In 2013, legislation
was unsuccessfully introduced in California that declared the legislature’s
intent to prohibit school districts from issuing CABs.276 Similarly,
legislation that would have prohibited the issuance of all CABs by Texas
local governments was introduced in 2013, and legislation that would have
prohibited the issuance of CABs payable from ad valorem property taxes by
Texas local governments was introduced in 2014 and 2015, though none
of these measures passed.277
Restricting the Use of CABs. The misuse of capital appreciation
bonds could be reduced or eliminated by restrictions on the issuance of
this type of debt. Both California’s AB 182 and Texas’s HB 114 adopted
this approach (as well as that of providing additional information),
narrowing the parameters within which school districts (and, in the case of
Texas, other local governments) can issue CABs payable from ad valorem
property taxes.278 While one can debate whether the restrictions in
275. MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. § 380.1351b (West 2016).
276. See S.B. 685, 2013–2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013) (“It is the intent of the Legislature to
enact legislation that prohibits a school district from issuing capital appreciation bonds.”).
277. Tex. H.B. 1750, 84th Leg., R.S. (2015); Tex. S.B. 103, 84th Leg., R.S. (2014); Tex.
H.B. 3416, 83rd Leg., R.S. (2013).
278. Assemb. B. 182, 2013–2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013); Act of May 26, 2015, 84th Leg.,
R.S., ch. 991, §§ 1–3, sec. 1201.0245, 2015 Tex. Gen. Laws 3517, 3519 (codified at TEX. GOV’T
CODE § 1201.0245).
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AB 182 or HB 114 strike the appropriate balance, carefully tailored
legislation could prevent the most problematic CABs issuances.
Problems with Prohibiting or Restricting the Use of CABs. A
prohibition or restriction that applied only to CABs, but not to other backloaded debt structures, would only partially address concerns about
interperiod equity, though it would eliminate one of the most egregious
violations of the principle. However, the restriction could be drafted to
apply to all back-loaded debt structures. For example, prior to 2010, many
California local government general obligation bond issuances (including
school district bonds with maturities in excess of twenty-five years) were
required to have substantially level debt service with limited exceptions.279
An outright prohibition or even the most carefully drafted restrictions
on the use of CABs—or back-loaded debt structures, generally—might
preclude districts from beneficial transactions such as financing needed
facilities or obtaining savings by refinancing debts,280 or might push them
towards using less desirable financing options. These issues would be of
particular concern for rapidly growing school districts, property-poor
districts and districts where assessed valuations have declined—all of
which may be particularly likely to issue CABs to avoid violating estimated
tax rate limits.281
Waivers. Allowing a state entity to authorize CABs issuances that
would otherwise be prohibited would provide additional flexibility and
input from experts.282 A statewide agency approving bonds or waiving

279. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 53508.5 (Deering 1993), repealed by Assemb. B. 1388, 2009–2010
Leg. Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2009).
280. Supra note 257 and accompanying text.
281. See supra Section IV (discussing rapidly growing school districts, property-poor districts,
and districts where assessed valuations have declined).
282. Another alternative would be to give a county official or agency, such as the County
Treasurer or County Department of Education, authority to grant a waiver. See Statement by Dan
McAllister, San Diego County Treasurer-Tax Collector, Capital Appreciation Bonds 5 Point Plan
Goals (2016) (on file with author) (suggesting, prior to the passage of AB 182, that school district
CABs be approved by either the County Superintendent of Schools or the County Board of
Supervisors, and that issuances outside of certain parameters be approved by the County
Superintendent of Schools); see also CAL. ASS’N OF CTY. TREASURERS & TAX COLLECTORS, SCHOOL
FINANCE COMMITTEE, SCHOOL FINANCE HANDBOOK FOR TTCS 18–19 (2015) (suggesting greater
county involvement in school district general obligations that fall outside of specified parameters);
L.A. CTY. CIV. GRAND JURY REPORT, supra note 86, at 127 (recommending greater involvement by
County Office of Education, Auditor, Treasurer-Tax Collector and others in school district
financings). While county officials and agencies would be more familiar with the needs of the region,
allowing waivers at the county level is likely to lead to inconsistent policies within the state and,
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restrictions on bond issuances is not a novel concept. In California, the
State Board of Education currently waives the limit on general obligation
debt as a percentage of assessed valuation for school districts and is
authorized to waive some of the new restrictions on CABs in limited
circumstances.283 In North Carolina, local governments cannot issue any
general obligation bonds without the approval of the North Carolina Local
Government Commission.284
CDIAC and the TBRB might be the appropriate entities to grant
waivers of restrictions on CABs in California and Texas, respectively.285
CDIAC’s role is to provide “information, education and technical
assistance on debt issuance and public fund investments to local public
agencies and other public finance professionals,”286 while TBRB’s mission
is, in part, “to support and enhance the debt issuance and debt
management functions of state and local entities.”287 CDIAC and TBRB
would have the general financial expertise and, particularly if they were
responsible for granting waivers of the limitations on CABs, the expertise
with CABs specifically, to determine whether a waiver was appropriate in a
particular case. In California, the State Board of Education would be
another possibility—this board already provides some waivers.288
particularly in smaller counties, the person or people responsible for granting the waiver may not
have significantly more expertise than the individuals at the school district.
283. See DAYTON, supra note 42, at 45 (noting that between 2000 and 2014, fifty-one waivers
of the limit on general obligation debt as a percentage of assessed valuation were requested, of which
forty-eight were approved). The State Board of Education may waive provisions of AB 182 for
bonds that refinance bond anticipation notes issued before December 31, 2013, if certain conditions
are met. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 15144.3 (Deering 2016).
284. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 159-51 (West 2016). North Carolina law also provides that for
issuances that include CABs, the North Carolina Local Government Commission may require that
annual debt service on the bonds be as nearly level as possible, may limit the amount of CABs and
may require that the use of CABs will not increase the aggregate amount of debt service on the
bonds. Id. § 159-100(b).
285. Others have suggested that CDIAC could fulfill a similar function, at least with respect
to transactions that are more likely to be problematic, perhaps in conjunction with lowering voter
approval requirements. See David Gamage & Darien Shanske, The Case for a State-Level Debt-Financing
Authority, 67 ST. TAX NOTES 188, 193 (2013) (identifying CDIAC as an appropriate entity to approve
debt issuances in conjunction with a reduction in voter approval thresholds for local government
debt).
286. CAL. DEBT & INV. ADVISORY COMM’N, About CDIAC, CAL. ST. TREASURER,
http://www.treasurer.ca.gov/cdiac/introduction.asp [https://perma.cc/H6GU-GYLB].
287. Tex.
Bond
Review
Bd.,
Agency
Overview,
http://www.brb.state.tx.us/
agency/about_brb.aspx [https://perma.cc/HEY3-GUKP].
288. See DAYTON, supra note 42, at 44–45 (analyzing waiver requests and approvals between
2000 and 2014).
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Alternative Funding. Banning or restricting the use of CABs would
have the effect of restricting the funding available to school districts that
could not issue CIBs without violating the applicable expected rate limit.
If the facilities these districts would otherwise finance are needed, an
alternative funding source would have to be found.
In new developments, developer fees are one option. California school
districts are authorized to levy fees on developers for the construction or
reconstruction of school facilities,289 though Texas school districts do not
have this authority under current law.290 Bonds payable from other
property-based taxes that are not subject to the expected rate limit, such as
Mello-Roos taxes in California, are another alternative, particularly for new
developments (where a developer can approve the tax before there are
multiple property owners).291 However, both of these forms of financing
are more advantageous to developing areas than to existing communities,
and increasing their use may further encourage urban sprawl292 and
exacerbate already existing funding disparities.
Alternatively, the state could provide additional loans and grants, ideally
in a way that targets districts with the greatest needs and that are most
adversely impacted by the prohibition or restriction on the use of CABs.
It is likely there would be political resistance to perceived redistribution of
wealth from some regions of the state to others,293 and there is a risk that
289. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 17620(a)(1) (Deering 2016).
290. See TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. §§ 395.001, 395.012 (West 2015 & Supp. 2017)
(providing impact fees may be collected only for specified purposes, which do not include schools).
291. The “vast majority of the [Mello-Roos districts] in Orange County are created and debt
incurred before any of the ultimate taxpayers acquire their property.” ORANGE CTY. GRAND JURY,
MELLO-ROOS: PERPETUAL DEBT ACCUMULATION AND TAX ASSESSMENT OBLIGATION 3 (2015),
http://www.ocgrandjury. org/pdfs/2014_2015_GJreport/Mello-Roos_Website.pdf [https://perma.
cc/RA9V-UQ6M]. The same is likely true elsewhere. See supra note 108 (discussing Mello-Roos
taxes in further detail).
292. See Darien Shanske, Above All Else Stop Digging: Local Government Law as a (Partial) Cause of
(and Solution to) the Current Housing Crisis, 43 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 663, 669 (2010) (suggesting MelloRoos taxes encourage urban sprawl).
293. Some suggest “[p]eople are much more willing to tax themselves to pay for public
education in their own local communities[]” than in other communities. Isabel Rodriguez-Tejedo &
John Joseph Wallis, Lessons for California from the History of Fiscal Constitutions, 2 CAL. J. OF POL. &
POL’Y, no. 3, 2010, at 1, 15, available at http://escholarship.org/uc/item/72b124q1
[https://perma.cc/L857-B46P]; see FISCHEL, supra note 104, at 98–118 (asserting the court-mandated
shift of school funding from local communities to the state led to the 1978 voter approval of
Proposition 13, which severely limits property taxes in California). This proposition was debated in
the UCLA Law Review. See Kirk Stark & Jonathan Zasloff, Tiebout and Tax Revolts: Did Serrano Really
Cause Proposition 13?, 50 UCLA L. REV. 801, 801 (2003); see also William A. Fischel, Did John Serrano
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political factors would result in a less than optimal distribution of these
resources. Nevertheless, grants or loans may be a better solution than the
alternatives of denying these districts needed facilities, allowing them to
issue CABs through a waiver program, or pushing them towards using
more expensive and less desirable lease revenue bonds or certificates of
participation.294 A targeted state grant or loan program could instead
assist in addressing some of the inherent inequity of a system that relies
largely on property tax revenues to finance capital projects for school
districts: that tax rates in property-poor districts must be higher than in
property-rich districts to pay for comparable facilities.
B. Reducing Incentives to Use CABs
Reducing incentives to use CABs could eliminate many instances of
misuse, and might have other benefits as well. While some circumstances
that encourage the use of CABs—such as rapidly growing student
populations or the desire to maintain substantially level tax rates—cannot
be changed, others can. Some of these are discussed below.
Re-evaluating Tax Rate Limitations. Debt limits and other
restrictions may simply encourage the development of alternative means of
accomplishing the same objectives; means that are “usually more complex,
more expensive, and typically are not discussed in public forums in ways
that are intelligible to the public and elected officials.”295 CABs are an

Vote for Proposition 13? A Reply to Stark and Zasloff’s “Tiebout and Tax Revolts: Did Serrano Really Cause
Propsition 13?” 51 UCLA L. REV. 887, 887–88 (2004). While Stark and Zasloff disagree with Fischell’s
position, they do note that shifts from local to state funding of public schools may reduce the level of
such funding. Stark & Zasloff, supra, at 854. Based on data from the Institute for Social Research
Center for California Studies at California State University, Sacramaento, more than 70% of school
district general obligation bond ballot measures in 2014 included language to the effect that funds
would be spent locally or could not be taken by the state. INST. FOR SOC. RESEARCH, 2012
ELECTIONS, supra note 49, at 19–39.
294. See Gamkhar & Koerner, supra note 175, at 38 (noting property-poor districts are more
likely to use lease revenue bonds, which may increase disparities because of the higher interest rates
on these bonds); see also supra notes 189–95 (discussing reasons these are less desirable). In addition,
because the school district obligations in these transactions are characterized as lease payments, the
nature of these transactions may be obscured from the public.
295. See JEFFREY I. CHAPMAN, PUB. POL’Y INST. OF CAL., PROPOSITION 13: SOME
UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES 15 (1998), http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/op/op_998jcop.pdf
[https://perma.cc/NZX2-RX5H] (discussing the effects of Proposition 13, which reduced property
taxes and eliminated general obligation bonds until subsequent constitutional amendments added the
California Two-Thirds Regime and later the California 55% Regime); see also Briffault, supra note 95,
at 925–27 (suggesting debt limits have not significantly affected the amount of debt but have made it
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example of this to the extent they are used to avoid violating the expected
rate limits. Thus, it is critical that the expected rate limits be evaluated to
determine whether they are appropriate or should be modified.
Current expected rate limits may be unduly restrictive and create more
problems than they solve. Assessed valuations may have increased at a
slower rate than inflation,296 and as a result, taxes at the specified limit
may be less burdensome than was contemplated when the restrictions
were put in place. A legislature might conclude that the relevant expected
rate limit should be higher or even eliminated in some or all circumstances.
For example, in 2015, the Texas Legislature considered a proposal to raise
the estimated tax rate for rapidly growing school districts as long as they
met certain conditions.297 A 2011 Texas bill would have replaced the
current test with a cap on the amount of outstanding debt as a percentage
of assessed valuation.298 While these bills ultimately failed, it is possible a
legislature would find a different modification appropriate (or find the
same modification appropriate at a different time). The elimination or
relaxing of expected rate limits almost certainly would reduce the use of
CABs.
On the other hand, a legislature might determine that the applicable
expected rate limitation is appropriate, or even that the limit should be
more restrictive. Expected rate limits certainly provide protection to
current taxpayers and at least some protection to future taxpayers.299 If a
limit is retained, additional protection should be provided to future
more expensive and less transparent). But see Farnham, supra note 34, at 1198 (finding limits reduce
debt levels but voter approval requirements do not).
296. This is particularly true in California, where Proposition 13 (passed in 1978) limits
assessed valuation increases. CDIAC PRIMER, supra note 30, at 85–86. Inflation has averaged 4.1%
per year since 1978 while assessed valuation increases are capped at the lesser of inflation or 2%
absent a change in ownership or new construction. CAL. LEGIS. ANALYST’S OFFICE, CALIFORNIA’S
PROPERTY TAX 1 (2012), http://www.lao.ca.gov/handouts/state_admin/2012/CA_Property_Tax_
4_11_12.pdf [https://perma.cc/E3QD-MNWP].
297. Tex. H.B. 506, 84th Leg., R.S. (2015).
298. Tex. H.B. 2168, 82nd Leg., R.S. (2011).
299. A binding limit on tax rates would provide greater protection, but because it also would
increase the risk to bondholders, interest rates on the bonds would be higher and the ability to issue
debt might be constrained. The expected rate limit for California school districts was originally
drafted as a tax rate cap, but was transformed into an expected rate limit before it took effect because
of these concerns. See Assemb. B. 1908, 1999–2000 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2000) (authorizing a cap on
the tax rate to be levied to pay debt service on bonds authorized under the California 55% Regime);
SCOTT, supra note 49, at 12–14 (explaining the initial requirement of California AB 1908 as an
“absolute, ironclad limit on tax rates to be levied to repay bonds under Prop. 39” and the change to a
limit on the projected tax rate, and describing its replacement with an expected rate limit).
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taxpayers.
For example, the legislature could impose reasonable
parameters on assessed valuation growth assumptions for purposes of
calculating compliance as the Texas legislature has endeavored to do, or
could require that projections take into account those made by the county
assessor, as a new California law requires for school boards ordering bond
elections.300 Reducing the ability of school districts to issue bonds based
on overly optimistic assumptions about assessed valuation growth would
be likely to reduce the use of CABs and other back-loaded debt structures.
A prohibition on CABs or a requirement that property taxes be levied as
interest compounds also would protect future taxpayers, though these
options come with significant problems.301
Par to Par Refunding Requirement. The Texas constitutional
provision that limits the amount of school district general obligation
refunding bonds that can be issued without voter approval to the principal
amount of the bonds being refinanced,302 and similar provisions, should
be reevaluated. It may be that replacing this restriction with one that
requires that the refunding bonds result in overall debt service savings or
even annual debt service savings would better protect taxpayers and would
eliminate one of the motivators for CABs in states that have provisions of
this type.303
Modifying the Promises Made to Voters. School districts use CABs
to simultaneously meet commitments to voters about tax rates and capital
projects.304 While a state would not be likely to (nor should it) prohibit
school districts from disclosing planned capital projects or estimated tax
rates to voters, it could require that other information be provided to
change the perception of what is being promised. This could discourage,
or at least reduce the motivation for, using CABs. For example, requiring
the total expected cost of repayment of the debt to be included with ballot

300. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. §§ 45.0031(b), (c) (West 2012); see CAL. EDUC. CODE
§ 15100(c) (Deering 2016) (requiring school boards ordering bond elections to obtain assessed
valuation projections that take into account those made by the county assessor). Although there is
no similar mandate for determinations of compliance with expected rate limits, having the
requirement in another context increases the likelihood that the same practice will be followed here.
301. See supra Section VI.A., “Problems with Prohibiting or Restricting the Use of CABs” and
infra “Collecting Property Taxes Throughout the Life of the CABs.”
302. See supra Section IV.F.
303. Admittedly, where, as in Texas, the provision is in the state constitution, it will be more
difficult to modify the provision since doing so would require a constitutional amendment.
304. See supra Section IV.B., “Keeping Promises to Voters.”
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materials, as became required in California beginning in 2015,305 might
deter districts from using more expensive debt structures. Similarly,
requiring disclosure of the assumptions used in estimated tax rate
calculations, a clear statement that actual rates may be higher in ballot
materials—and perhaps anywhere else that districts publish the estimated
rates—and statements that projects might not be completed in some
circumstances (for example, if issuing the bonds necessary to complete
them were projected to raise tax rates over specified levels), or some
combination of or all of the above, could reduce the sense that estimated
rates and listed projects are “promises.”306 Even if this did not reduce the
use of CABs, it would make important information more readily available
to the public.
Establishing reasonable parameters for assessed valuation growth
assumptions for purposes of calculating projected tax rates included with
ballot materials also might reduce the use of CABs because there would be
less likelihood that school district boards and officials would face
difficulties keeping the “promise[s]” made to voters about tax rates and
capital projects.307 A California law that requires school boards ordering
an election to obtain “reasonable and informed projections of assessed
property valuations that take into consideration projections of assessed
property valuations made by the county assessor”308 beginning in 2017 is
a step in the right direction. Although the new law does not specify a
projection methodology or require that the assessor’s projections be used,
there likely is a benefit to the board having this information from the party
that is responsible for determining the taxable value of property in the
county. Further, while the requirement does not speak directly to the
projections that are provided to voters, it is likely that school boards would
provide tax rate estimates based on these projections or if they did not,
that they would have a reasoned basis for basing estimates on different
projections.
In addition, counting interest on CABs against voter authorization and,
in California, limits on debt as a percentage of assessed valuation, would

305. CAL. ELEC. CODE § 9401(a)(4) (Deering 2016).
306. See ORANGE CTY. GRAND JURY, SCHOOL BONDS, supra note 83, at 31, 33 (suggesting
districts make assessed valuation assumptions supporting historical data and an explanation of the
basis for the assumptions available to voters).
307. See supra Section IV.E. for discussion of these assumptions.
308. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 15100(c) (Deering 2013 & Supp. 2017).
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more clearly comply with the binding promises made to the voters not to
issue debt exceeding these limits. This is discussed in Section VI.C.
Re-evaluating Matching Fund Requirements and Providing
Alternative Funding Sources. State grants that cannot be accessed
unless the district is contributing funds to the project encourage districts to
issue CABs to maximize the amount the district can contribute to the
project (and hence the amount of state funding it can receive). These
incentives should be considered when evaluating the costs and benefits of
matching fund programs and contemplating alternative funding
approaches. Similarly, alternative funding sources for school districts,
particularly for districts that may have stronger incentives to issue CABs,
may alleviate some of the pressures to use this financing structure.
Collecting Property Taxes throughout the Life of the CABs. If
state law required school districts to collect property taxes to pay interest
as it compounded, they likely would issue far fewer capital appreciation
bonds since one of the principal reasons they use CABs is to avoid tax
increases in the near term (because of expected rate limits or otherwise).
Districts would still have the flexibility to issue CABs (at least if they
weren’t constrained by expected rate limits) if doing so were the most
cost-effective financing method in the circumstances.
To the extent a district did issue CABs, taxpayers would be paying for
debt service through the life of the bonds, addressing one of the major
problems with this type of debt. School districts and other issuers could
either pay the principal and interest compounded on that principal over a
period of several years, or invest amounts collected until the time payment
is due on the bonds.309 While requiring funds to be put aside far in
advance of scheduled payment dates is uncommon for tax-exempt bonds,
some taxable municipal bond transactions include these provisions.310
309. In the case of tax-exempt bonds, school investment of these amounts would be subject
to provisions of Section 148 of the Internal Revenue Code and related regulations that restrict the
yield on such investments to the yield on the bonds. 26 U.S.C. § 148 (2012).
310. See, e.g., ALHAMBRA UNIFIED SCH. DIST., $13,199,720.85 ELECTION OF 2008 GENERAL
OBLIGATION BONDS, SERIES B (TAX-EXEMPT), $11,800,800.00 ELECTION OF 2008 GENERAL
OBLIGATION BONDS, SERIES B-1 (QUALIFIED SCHOOL CONSTRUCTION BONDS – DIRECT
PAYMENT TO ISSUER) (FEDERALLY TAXABLE) 15 (2011), http://emma.msrb.org/EP494671EP385881-EP782826.pdf [https://perma.cc/D27A-VHLH] (indicating sinking fund deposits are
required although the bonds are not subject to mandatory sinking fund redemption); S. SAN
ANTONIO INDEP. SCH. DIST., OFFICIAL STATEMENT DATED AUGUST 3, 2010, at 5–7 (2010),
http://emma.msrb.org/EA402884-EA315370-EA711082.pdf
[https://perma.cc/X7CG-BL8P]
(stating requirement that sinking fund deposits be made with respect to bonds that are not subject to
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Requiring taxes to be levied as interest compounds would be consistent
with accrual accounting principles, under which interest would be treated
as an expense as it compounds.311 Such a requirement also would be
consistent with the treatment of interest that is not paid until maturity
(such as interest on CABs) and original issue discount for federal income
tax purposes. Under the Internal Revenue Code and related regulations,
these amounts generally are included in income and deducted as expenses
as they accrue over the term of the debt.312
However, requiring the collection of taxes to pay interest as it
compounds would prevent districts that were constrained by expected rate
limits from issuing general obligation bonds at all. Like prohibiting or
restricting the use of CABs, this approach could prevent districts from
completing needed projects, and might disproportionately affect rapidly
growing and property-poor districts. As a result, a waiver program or
alternative funding sources might be needed.
C. Providing Additional Information, Training, Guidance, or a Combination of
These
A third approach, driven by concerns that school districts issue CABs
without understanding the ramifications of doing so, is to require that
additional information be presented to district officials and the public, to
provide training and support to governing boards and officials, and to
strengthen the ability of districts to negotiate with financial advisors and
underwriters. In a similar vein, counting compounded interest against
voter-authorized amounts and, in California, the limit on debt as a
percentage of assessed valuations, would make the true amount of debt
being incurred clearer both to school district board members and officials,
and to the public.
mandatory sinking fund redemption). Mandatory deposits likely would preserve the economic
benefit of CABs when interest rates are high better than mandatory prepayments because investors
presumably require that CABs subject to mandatory prepayment have a higher yield to account for
the possibility that they would have to reinvest not only earnings but also principal at lower yields
prior to the scheduled maturity date.
311. See supra notes 123–29 and accompanying text.
312. See GARLOCK, supra note 123, at ch. 2, 5 (describing the applicable rules and exceptions);
see also INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, PUB. NO. 1212, GUIDE TO
ORIGINAL ISSUE DISCOUNT (OID) INSTRUMENTS (2016), https://www.irs.gov/publications/p1212
[https://perma.cc/66QK-R3UY] (explaining how OID is included in income and providing some
exceptions). These rules treat CABs and zero-coupon bonds identically. GARLOCK, supra, note 123,
at 28, para. 201.
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Requirements to Provide Information. Both AB 182 and HB 114
require that school boards and the public receive additional information
about CABs issuances, including information on overall debt service and
the assumptions that are being made about growth in assessed
valuations.313 Some districts have refinanced their CABs in recent years,
even when doing so increased taxes in the short run, presumably in
response to greater awareness and negative public attention given to
CABs.314 On the other hand, issuances of general obligation CABs by
California school districts increased significantly in 2015 despite the
additional information requirements included in AB 182.315 However,
even if additional information does not ultimately reduce issuances of
CABs, it will increase board members’ and district officials’ understanding
of the implications of the actions they are taking and public awareness,
thereby possibly preventing some of the most problematic issuances.
313. See Assemb. B. 182, 2013–14 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013) (mandating the presentation of
additional information to school boards and the public on bonds sales that allow for the
compounding of interest); see also TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. §§ 1201.0245(b), (d) (West Supp. 2017)
(requiring additional information be provided to the school board, included in the board’s minutes
and posted on the district’s website). The California Association of County Treasurers and Tax
Collectors similarly recommends that boards considering a bond measure receive information about
the assumed assessed valuation growth rates reflected in tax rate projections and information about
historic assessed valuation growth. See CAL. ASS’N OF CTY TREASURERS AND TAX COLLECTORS,
supra note 283, at 9, 18 (recommending the board be presented with information about assumptions,
expected use of CABs and other information).
314. At least nine school districts and community college districts have refinanced CABs in
recent years. See Napa School Bonds Converted to Save Taxpayers Money, VALLEJO TIMES-HERALD,
(Jan. 25, 2016, 4:03 PM), http://www.timesheraldonline.com/general-news/20160125/napa-schoolbonds-converted-to-save-taxpayers-money [https://perma.cc/2F35-2Y6G]; see also District Completes
UNIFIED
SCH.,
https://www.dublin.k12.ca.us/site/
Successful
Bond
Sale,
DUBLIN
default.aspx?PageType=3&DomainID=1&ModuleInstanceID=1197&ViewID=047E6BE3-6D874130-8424-D8E4E9ED6C2A&RenderLoc=0&FlexDataID=31507&PageID=1 [https://perma.cc/
K6AK-5Y53]. Some of these transactions resulted in higher tax rates in the near term. Keeley
Webster, California School CABs Make Comeback, THE BOND BUYER (Jan. 28, 2016, 12:55 PM),
http://www.bondbuyer.com/news/regionalnews/california-school-cabs-make-comeback-10951121.html [https://perma.cc/GW2T-K278]. However, the Poway Unified School District did not
refinance its CABs after extensive discussion and three public meetings, perhaps because of the
public opposition to possibly raising tax rates without obtaining voter approval. See POWAY
UNIFIED SCH. DIST., BOARD BRIEFS: HIGHLIGHTS FROM THE OCT. 13, 2014 BOARD OF
EDUCATION MEETING 1–2 (2014), https://www.powayusd.com/board/boardBriefs/201415BoardBriefs/10-13-14PUSDBoardBriefs.pdf [https://perma.cc/VH34-NADV] (showing 53.75%
of the voters opposed the CABs because of tax concerns).
315. See CAL. DEBT & INV. ADVISORY COMM’N, Capital Appreciation Bond Issuance – After the
Passage of AB 182, DEBT LINE, June 2016, at 3 (showing an increase in CAB issuance of $665 million
from 2014 to 2015).
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Another step in the direction of transparency would be to require
school districts and other issuers to post debt service schedules for all their
general obligation bonds as well as estimates of future tax rates and the
assumptions underlying those estimates on their websites, or, better yet, to
provide this information to the state for posting on sites like the Texas
Comptroller’s “Texas Transparency” site316 and the California Treasurer’s
“Debt Watch” site.317 While, at least in many cases, overall debt service
schedules can be located on the MSRB’s electronic municipal market
access web site,318 members of the public likely would not know to go to
a site designed for municipal bond investors and might have difficulty
locating the information. Information about estimated future tax rates and
the assumptions underlying those estimates would be even more difficult
to locate. Having this information readily available would improve
transparency and would be a step towards capitalization of debt service
structures into home values.
Training and Other Support. Additional education of school boards
and district staff members would increase their understanding of the
implications of capital appreciation bonds, and of debt financings
generally.319
In addition to training, information about what other districts are doing
and the fees and interest rates that other districts pay could assist districts
in their decision-making. It is particularly difficult for issuers and their
advisors to compare fees and valuations for more complicated types of
bonds320 (since CABs are far less common than CIBs they likely would
fall in this category). While some information about costs of issuance and

316. Transparency, TEXAS COMPTROLLER, https://comptroller.texas.gov/transparency/
[https://perma.cc/F5FX-KARY].
317. Debt Watch, CALIFORNIA STATE TREASURER, http://debtwatch.treasurer.ca.gov/
[https://perma.cc/7XW2-SJTS].
318. ELECTRONIC MUN. MKT. ACCESS (EMMA), supra note 223.
319. Others have recommended providing more education and training about bonds and debt
management. See U.S. ADVISORY COMM’N, STATE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO LOCAL DEBT
MANAGEMENT, supra note 212, at 43–45 (“Just as many State tax agencies are now providing inservice training for local assessors, so should the States be instructing local finance officers in the
intricacies of borrowing money.”); see also Bill Simonsen, et al., supra note 214, at 715 (recommending
counties or states provide “advisory services and technical assistance,” including training, to smaller
governments, though noting that training alone may not be sufficient).
320. Ang & Green, supra note 77, at 10.
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interest rates is available from CDIAC and the TBRB,321 the information
is not complete. For example, the yield is provided for the entire bond
issue, not for each series or maturity, and there is a lag between the time
fees and interest rates are established and the time the information is
available through these entities; other local governments are unlikely to
know the specific reasons for variations in costs. While this information is
valuable, it does not provide issuers with all the information they need to
evaluate the rates they are receiving.
Other types of assistance also would be beneficial. For example, the
Los Angeles County Treasurer and Tax Collector’s Office developed a set
of form documents that several school districts used to competitively bid
for bond counsel, financial advisors and underwriters.322 Such forms
have reportedly saved the districts “tens of thousands of dollars.”323 The
availability of one-on-one guidance from an entity like CDIAC or the
TBRB, or even the option of having one of these entities or another state
agency manage the bond issuance process for school districts on a purely
voluntary basis would be valuable.324 In addition to potentially preventing
school districts from entering into transactions that would be
disadvantageous and helping eliminate information asymmetries regarding
fees and interest rates, access to disinterested technical expertise could
enable districts to evaluate the risks of more complex or unusual
transactions and enter into these transactions when it was beneficial to do
so.325
Additional Regulation of Financial Advisors and Underwriters.
Financial advisors and underwriters are already regulated at the federal

321. CAL. DEBT AND INVEST. ADVISORY COMMISSION, http://www.treasurer.ca.gov/
cdiac/index.asp [https://perma.cc/J7GR-MYAB]; TEX. BOND REV. BD., http://www.brb.
state.tx.us/ [https://perma.cc/56CD-LQAK].
322. Memorandum from Mark J. Saladino, Cty. of L.A. Treasurer and Tax Collector to Mark
Ridley-Thomas, et al., 2 (Aug. 8, 2013) (on file with author) [hereinafter Memorandum from Mark J.
Saladino].
323. Id.
324. The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations made similar suggestions in
1965. U.S. ADVISORY COMM’N, STATE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO LOCAL DEBT MANAGEMENT,
supra note 212, at 46–47, 55–58. More recently, commentators suggested creating a nonprofit that,
among other things, would provide affordable, independent advice to municipalities. Ang & Green,
supra note 77, at 6, 13–15, 17.
325. See Whitaker, supra note 213 (noting lack of expertise may lead smaller local governments
to avoid complex transactions even when they would be beneficial).
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level,326 but additional state regulation also may be appropriate. This
would not be unprecedented. California already has laws that regulate
some aspects of the relationship between local governments and their
financial advisors327 and other laws have been proposed but not
adopted.328
State and local government agencies might also take independent
actions to curtail underwriter and financial advisor behavior that they
deem inappropriate. For example, in 2012 the California Treasurer
threatened to exclude underwriters involved in “egregious” California
school district CABs issuances from state bond issuances if they did not
restructure the transactions, though he ultimately did allow them to
participate in the state’s bond issuances.329 In 2016, the California
treasurer announced that underwriters, financial advisors, and bond
counsel that make cash or in-kind contributions to, or provide certain
types of services in support of, bond election campaigns in the state would
not be eligible to provide services on state bond issuances.330 Similarly,
326. For example, the activities of underwriters and municipal advisors are regulated under
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (which is codified at Title 15 of the United States Code at
Section 74(o-4)) and the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board establishes rules that underwriters
and municipal advisors must follow. See MSRB Rules and Guidance, MUNICIPAL SEC. RULEMAKING
BOARD., http://www.msrb.org/Rules-and-Interpretations/MSRB-Rules.aspx [https://perma.cc/
WFD6-QQ5B] (providing text of the MSRB rules governing underwriters and municipal advisors).
327. See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 53591, 53592 (Deering 2011) (requiring written contracts
and prohibiting financial advisors from being compensated on the basis of a percentage of the
amount of bonds sold and from purchasing bonds for which they served as financial advisor directly
from the issuer).
328. For example, bills have been introduced that would have prohibited local governments
from hiring underwriters, financial advisors, or lawyers to provide services for issuances of general
obligation bonds if those outside consultants had provided campaign services in support of or
contributed to the ballot measure under which the bonds were approved. Assemb. B. 621, 2013–
2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2014); Assemb. B. 1045, 2011–2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal 2012); S.B. 623,
2009–2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2010); S.B. 1461, 2009–2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2010); Assemb. B.
2011, 2007–2008 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2008). One of these bills also would have prohibited local
governments from hiring the same firm as financial advisor and as underwriter for a bond issue.
Assemb. B. 621, 2013–2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2014).
329. See Randall Jensen, California CAB Underwriters May Pay in Spring, THE BOND BUYER
(Nov. 6, 2012, 2:26 PM), http://www.bondbuyer.com/issues/121_215/california-cab-underwritersmay-pay-in-spring-1045638-1.html [https://perma.cc/5DKX-WHS4]; see also Randall Jensen, Lockyer
Caves on CAB Penalty, THE BOND BUYER (Feb. 11, 2013), http://www.bondbuyer.com/issues/
122_29/california-treasurer-bill-lockyer-set-multi-billion-calendar-for-spring-1048596-1.html
[https://perma.cc/HV9J-2QTZ].
330. See Press Release, Cal. State Treasurer, Chiang and County Treasurers Move to Stop ‘Payto-Play’ School Bond Campaigns (July 27, 2016), http://www.treasurer.ca.gov/news/
releases/2016/20160727.asp [https://perma.cc/3863-ADVN] (“[M]unicipal finance firms seeking
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Los Angeles County prohibits underwriters that make cash contributions
or provide in-kind services to promote school district or community
college district general obligation bond ballot measures in California from
selling county debt.331
Counting Compounded Interest Against Debt Limits. As was
discussed in Section III.C., interest that compounds on capital
appreciation bonds is not counted against voter-authorized amounts and
limits on total debt outstanding. Counting compounded interest for these
purposes would be consistent with its accounting and tax treatment and
would make the true amount of debt clearer to both school district
officials and to the public.
Rather than requiring school districts to determine compliance with
debt limits as the interest compounds, state law could instead mandate that
the anticipated compounded interest (to the extent not already included in
the portion of original issue premium counted against voter authorization)
be included in compliance calculations at the time the bonds are issued.
This would eliminate the risk that a limit would not be met at the time the
interest compounds. For example, if assessed valuations declined after
bonds were issued, the interest might violate a limit on debt as a
percentage of assessed valuations like the one applicable to California
school districts even if it would not have (had it been included at the time
the bonds were issued)—a risk that bond purchasers presumably would be
unwilling to bear without charging higher interest rates as compensation.
In addition, this approach would impose a smaller administrative burden
on districts than a requirement that they recalculate compliance each time
interest compounds. If a series of CABs were to be repaid prior to
maturity, any interest that did not ultimately compound could be available
again for a concurrent or future bond issuance.
state business will be required to certify that they make no contributions to bond election
campaigns.”); see also Form Letter from John Chiang, Cal. State Treasurer (July 27, 2016),
http://www.treasurer.ca.gov/news/releases/2016/20160727_letter.pdf [https://perma.cc/6QY7BQAE] (defining “bond campaign services” as services such as “fundraising, public opinion polling,
election strategy and management, organization of campaign volunteers, get out the vote services,
development of campaign literature, and advocacy materials”).
331. See CTY. OF L.A. TREASURER AND TAX COLLECTOR, REQUEST FOR STATEMENT OF
QUALIFICATIONS LOS ANGELES COUNTY UNDERWRITER POOL app. A at 2 (2015),
[https://perma.cc/4XQK-YLKV] (“Firms in the Underwriter Pool are prohibited from making cash
contributions or providing in-kind services to promote or facilitate California school or community
college district campaigns for general obligation bond ballot measures.”); see also Memorandum from
Mark J. Saladino, supra note 322 (describing the reasons for the prohibition).
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Counting the full amount of interest at the time the debt is issued would
arguably result in over-counting against the voter-authorized amount since
the present value of interest that will compound in the future is less than
the total dollar amount of that interest. Furthermore, counting all interest
that is expected to compound against limits on outstanding debt as a
percentage of assessed valuations—such as the limit that applies to
California school districts—at the time of issuance would, in effect, make
these limits more restrictive to the extent that a district had outstanding
debt that was scheduled to be repaid before the interest would compound.
Nevertheless, the cost of this approach is small when compared with the
problems created by testing the total debt against the limit as interest
compounds.
While the result of such legal changes might simply be that voters are
asked to (and do) approve higher amounts of debt and that California
school districts apply for waivers of the outstanding debt limit more
frequently, these changes would still have a positive impact in that the full
amount of debt would be clearer to elected officials, administrators and
voters.
VII. CONCLUSION
As the use of CABs by California and Texas school districts
demonstrates, local governments have incentives to defer debt service to
benefit today’s population at the expense of future residents, and these
incentives are intensified in some circumstances.
In theory, the problems associated with CABs and with back-loaded
debt service structures, generally, could be solved by requiring substantially
level debt service (allowing adjustment for expected inflation) on all bond
issuances, and by treating compounding interest as debt service and
requiring taxes to be levied in an amount sufficient to pay the interest as it
compounds. This would prevent the disproportionate burdening of future
taxpayers while still allowing CABs to be used when they resulted in lower
debt service costs.
In practice, however, this solution would make it more difficult for
issuers to maintain level tax rates, and in many instances, would result in
higher near-term tax rates—particularly in districts that already have
outstanding debt and in rapidly growing areas. Districts that already have
outstanding debt would not be able to structure new debt around their
existing debt. In rapidly growing areas, facilities are being constructed to
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support a growing population and are expected to be paid by a larger
future assessed valuation base. Higher near-term tax rates would make it
politically more difficult to issue debt and might result in underinvestment
in infrastructure. Furthermore, requiring substantially level debt service
would prevent some issuers that are subject to expected rate limits from
incurring any debt or making any significant investment in infrastructure.
Thus, states are confronted with the challenge of restricting the ability
of local governments to issue CABs (or back-loaded debt generally), or
reducing their incentives to do so without driving them to use less
desirable financing options, preventing the construction of needed
facilities, or impeding refinancings that result in lower debt service. The
appropriate solution will vary from state to state and may differ for
different types of local governments depending on factors such as: other
state laws, the importance that a state places on local control, the severity
of infrastructure needs, and the availability of alternate funding sources.
Nevertheless, some general principles apply.
First, addressing the incentives that lead local governments to issue
CABs is likely to be more effective than restricting or prohibiting CABs or
back-loaded debt. Even the most carefully tailored restrictions will
prevent some transactions that are socially desirable and allow some
transactions that are not. Further, issuers and their advisors will search for
ways to meet their objectives without violating the restrictions. The means
they employ—such as lease revenue bonds, COPs, and potentially
others—are likely to be more expensive or less transparent than general
obligation CABs would have been, and may also create other problems.
Thus, as an initial step, states should evaluate their existing laws to
determine whether these laws are fulfilling their intended purposes and to
what extent they are increasing incentives to issue CABs. For example,
states that impose expected rate limits on some or all local governments
(as California and Texas do on school districts), should evaluate these
limits since they are one of the principal reasons that CABs are used. If
these limits are to be retained, states should consider setting reasonable
parameters for calculating projected assessed valuations. States with parto-par refunding restrictions should consider the merits of those limits and
whether they can be modified.
States also should consider whether aspects of their systems for
financing infrastructure are increasing incentives to issue CABs and, if so,
whether these systems should be modified. States that only provide
funding for capital projects if local governments provide matching funds
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may choose to reconsider these requirements. States may also consider
implementing or expanding grant or loan programs that target areas of
particular need such as rapidly growing districts or property-poor districts
with aging infrastructure. Of course, infrastructure funding is complex
and there are numerous considerations involved in the structuring of
financing programs. Incentives to issue CABs are but one factor that
should be evaluated.
Second, adequate training about debt and capital financing for local
government board members and officials and access to expertise is very
important. Training and access to experts would allow local governments
to make better decisions for their communities not only with respect to
CABs and other back-loaded debt, but with respect to infrastructure
financing generally. The extent to which the involvement of state experts
in financings is mandated or is at the option of the local government, likely
will vary from state to state depending on the importance that a state and
its residents place on local control.
Finally, making information about the amount and structure of local
government debt and about expected future tax rates and the assumptions
underlying them to both local government board members and officials,
and to the public is important. Counting compounded interest against
debt limits (at least absent a requirement that taxes be levied to pay that
interest as it compounds) is a critical component of this. Clear, accurate,
and accessible information is important for local governments to make
good decisions and for the public to be able to effectively participate in the
democratic process.
Given the important role that local government debt plays in the
construction of public infrastructure in United States and the country’s
looming infrastructure needs, these problems cannot be ignored.
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